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This study investigates the effects of insider entrenchment on Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) compensation in firms conducting an initial public offering (IPO). The 
sample comprises 220 US firms that went public between 1996 and 2002. Corporate 
governance choices regarding entrenchment are captured by six provisions in the 
corporate charter and bylaws, as well as five anti-takeover statutes, which may or may 
not be in effect in the state of incorporation. Firm-level items are supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments, bylaws amendments, and merger approvals, along 
with the presence or absence of a staggered board of directors, poison pills, and golden 
parachute agreements. The anti-takeover laws examined are Business Combination, 
xii 
 
Control Share Acquisition, Fair Price, Poison Pill Endorsement, and Constituencies 
Statutes. A factor analysis reveals three distinct components of entrenchment: firm- and 
state-level external entrenchment and firm-level internal entrenchment. External 
entrenchment is related to market control over management by means of corporate 
takeovers; internal entrenchment relates to shareholder control over management by 
means of their voting power.  
Evidence is found for a positive association between entrenchment at IPO and 
subsequent CEO cash and total compensation. These relationships are driven by firm-
level external entrenchment. Firm-level external entrenchment is also significantly and 
positively associated with CEO stock-based compensation. The positive effects of 
entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation appear not to be transitory and remain 
constant for at least five years post-IPO. Furthermore, entrenchment at IPO is shown to 
affect CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. On balance, entrenchment reduces the 
sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock returns and returns on assets.  
The results of this study underscore the crucial importance of insiders' governance 
decisions made at the time of the IPO. Little support is found for a re-balancing of 
components of the CEO's compensation contract in response to entrenchment as 
predicted under the optimal contracting theory of compensation contracts. The findings of 
this study are almost entirely consistent with the managerial power theory, according to 
which entrenchment at IPO causes a permanent shift in bargaining power, which enables 
CEOs to influence compensation contracts in their favor.  
1Chapter 1 
Introduction 
I investigate the effect of insider entrenchment in firms conducting an initial 
public offering (IPO) on contemporaneous and prospective Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) compensation. My study thus is located at the point where the compensation and 
governance literatures intersect. Although executive compensation and corporate 
governance constitute two of the largest areas of accounting research, studies examining 
the juncture of the two domains are relatively scarce. My study sets out to add to these 
bodies of literature, which I will review in the following chapter, primarily in three ways.  
Firstly, I introduce a comprehensive measure of insiders’ “total” entrenchment, 
which is based on two distinct dimensions of shareholder’s legal rights: the dimensions of 
internal and external entrenchment. In my framework, internal entrenchment reflects the 
efficacy of shareholder control over management due to shareholders’ voting rights, 
while external entrenchment primarily concerns the effectiveness of market control over 
management as reflected in provisions affecting the ease of corporate takeovers. No 
existent study that I am aware of has assessed the joint and separate effects of these 
underlying components of entrenchment on executive compensation.  
Secondly, my focus on IPO firms enables me to assess the long-term effects of 
crucial governance decisions at IPO on CEO compensation. While other widely studied 
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governance characteristics, such as board characteristics or ownership structure (e.g., 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Cyert, Kang, and Kumar, 2002), are subject to 
continuous change, legal determinants of governance, particularly those affecting 
shareholder voting rights—the prime example being a dual-class structure of stock—are 
essentially determined at IPO and rarely, if ever, change over the course of a 
corporation’s life. Furthermore, "going back in time" and considering firms’ governance 
posture adopted at IPO also helps address endogeneity concerns that plague any study of 
the contemporaneous relationship between corporate governance characteristics and 
executive compensation in established firms.  
Thirdly, I go beyond ascertaining a relationship, if any, between entrenchment at 
IPO and levels of CEO compensation. Specifically, I study how entrenchment at IPO 
affects the design of CEO compensation contracts and assess the effect of entrenchment 
on CEOs pay-for-performance sensitivity. The focus is on determining to what extent 
entrenchment moderates the relative use of accounting- and/or market-based performance 
measures in the design of the CEO's compensation contract.  
Considering the first contribution of this study in more detail, from the universe of 
factors contributing to a firm's corporate governance posture, I focus on insider 
entrenchment. According to Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, entrenchment is "the act of 
establishing so solidly or strongly as to make dislodgment or change extremely difficult." 
Thus, my understanding of entrenchment is different from studies such as Gul and Wah 
(2002), who equalize entrenchment and inside ownership. My focus is on legal actions 
that insiders may take at IPO to make their replacement post-IPO difficult if not 
3
impossible. In this context, I consider determinants of shareholders' versus insiders' rights 
at the firm level contained in the firm's corporate charter and bylaws, as well as in the 
statutory law of the state of incorporation. Furthermore, I differentiate between external 
and internal entrenchment.  
The notion that corporate governance is a combination of external and internal 
governance mechanisms has been put forward by Cyert et al. (2002), Cremers and Nair 
(2005), and Davila and Penalva (2006). In the framework of all of these studies, legal 
provisions adopted at the firm-level relating to the market for corporate control constitute 
external governance characteristics, whereas direct monitoring of management by the 
board of directors or influential shareholders (blockholders) contribute to internal 
governance. Thus, external governance is based on the legal environment of the firm, 
while internal governance is based on firms' board characteristics or ownership structure 
with a bearing on monitoring quality. I believe that monitoring quality and internal 
entrenchment are distinct constructs, however. Holding constant monitoring quality, i.e., 
board structure or ownership characteristics, the exercise of shareholder control over 
corporate insiders may still be more or less difficult due to differences in shareholder’s 
legal rights. Therefore, while I borrow these studies’ terminology and conceptualization, 
my measures of external and internal entrenchment are constructed to parallel each other. 
Both focus on legal determinants with a direct bearing on the ease of dislodgment. I 
consider a total of eleven legal determinants of entrenchment: six provisions that insiders 
may adopt at the firm level and five state laws.  
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The firm-level components of my entrenchment measure are the items forming 
the entrenchment index proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). Their 
entrenchment index combines a parsimonious set of six firm-level governance provisions 
with strong entrenching effects. Four of these six items concern internal entrenchment 
due to restrictions on shareholders' voting power: staggered boards, supermajority 
requirements to approve bylaws, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, 
and supermajority requirements for approving a merger. The two remaining items are two 
prominent takeover defenses—poison pills and golden parachutes—which contribute to 
external entrenchment by increasing the cost of corporate takeovers and, thus, reducing 
the effective exercise market control over management. Bebchuk et al. (2005) 
demonstrate that these six items fully drive the correlation between the G-Index, the most 
widely used aggregate corporate governance index combining a total of twenty-four 
items (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), and firm value and stock returns. Their 
finding that in the presence of these six provisions, no other indicators of shareholder 
rights contained in the G-Index have a discernible effect on firm value or stock returns, 
strongly supports my design of an entrenchment measure based on shareholder voting 
rights and takeover defenses. 
Furthermore, firms self-select into legal environments at IPO by choosing their 
state of incorporation. During the period 1991 to 2000, around 70% of IPO firms chose 
not to incorporate in their home state but rather to seek out-of-state incorporation 
(Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003). Bebchuk and Cohen show that firms' decisions where to 
incorporate can be explained by the presence or absence of five standard types of state 
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anti-takeover statutes: control share acquisition statutes, fair price statutes, business 
combination statutes limiting freeze-outs, poison pill endorsement, and statutes allowing 
the interests of non-shareholders to be wagered against takeover bids. Since the efficacy 
of the market for corporate control is affected not only by steps taken at the firm-level but 
also by the friendliness (or hostility) of the legal environment for corporate takeovers, I 
also include these five takeover statutes in my measure of external entrenchment. 
Strong theoretical and empirical support exists for the relevance of all of these 
eleven items affecting entrenchment at IPO, as will be discussed in detail in the variable 
measurement section of the methodology chapter. The combined effect of these items on 
executive compensation has not been studied to date. Moreover, the differential effects of 
entrenchment due to restrictions on internal versus external control over management 
have also not yet been explored. Instead, the few existing studies on shareholder rights 
and compensation have used composite measures of a large number of governance 
characteristics (e.g., Fahlenbrach, 2008; Davila and Penalva, 2006; Jiraporn, Kim, and 
Davidson, 2005). The specific effects of these characteristics, if any, on either 
management-shareholder relations or market control over management are not always 
unambiguous. To conclude, the measure of insider entrenchment used in this study 
improves upon other proxies for entrenchment in multiple ways. It is more parsimonious 
and more specific due to its focus on legal determinants but at the same time more 
detailed, as it differentiates between two distinct aspects of total entrenchment: 
limitations on shareholder voting rights (internal entrenchment) and restrictions on the 
market for corporate control (external entrenchment). 
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This study is furthermore unique in its focus on firms conducting an initial public 
offering. I specifically focus on IPO firms to provide for a unique testing ground for 
agency-theoretical predictions. The initial public offering is a key event in separating 
ownership from control; pre-IPO firms tend to feature high inside ownership. 
Consequently, agency issues of the type considered by Berle and Means (1932) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) are not of general concern in the pre-IPO period. The initial 
sale of shares to the public, however, forces firms for the first time to consider how to 
mitigate owner-manager, i.e., principal-agent, conflicts. Corporate governance decisions 
at the time of the IPO are therefore crucial (Baker and Gompers, 2003).  
Few studies, however, focus on how corporate governance characteristics of IPO 
firms affect CEO compensation. Conyon and He (2004) examine the effect of 
compensation committee characteristics on CEO compensation in entrepreneurial firms. 
Engel, Gordon, and Hayes (2002) find that differences in IPO firms' information 
environment are associated with differences in the use of accounting and stock-based 
performance measures in the determination of CEO pay. Field and Karpoff (2002) study 
IPO firms' use of anti-takeover measures finding that high CEO cash compensation prior 
to the IPO explains the adoption of antitakeover measures at IPO. Their study informs the 
current one since it draws attention to the relevance of governance decisions at IPO, but it 
is discernibly dissimilar in that its focus is on CEO compensation as a potential 
antecedent, rather than a consequence, of entrenchment. No previous study of which I am 
aware of specifically investigates the long-term effects on compensation stemming from 
a firm’s governance posture taken at IPO. The ability to assess how governance 
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decisions, which have been exogenously determined by the firm’s insiders at IPO, 
contribute to principal-agent problems, and how compensation contracts are used over 
time to address these problems, constitutes a primary advantage of studying IPO firms. 
The theoretical framework of the aforementioned studies, however, did not always take 
advantage of the unique ability to test agency-theoretical predictions in a sample of firms 
where agency problems have only just been created, and thus may only have been 
imperfectly remedied.  
In addition, my focus on IPO firms also facilitates one further improvement over 
previous studies: a more effective control of endogeneity. Empirical work on the 
influence of any given corporate governance characteristic on executive compensation is 
generally plagued by the problem of joint endogeneity of variables. Results may therefore 
be equally consistent with an unobserved, firm-specific variable driving both governance 
and compensation (Core et al. 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999). The retrospective 
approach of my study, tracing back to the beginning of a firm's timeline, the IPO, 
considerably mitigates concerns of simultaneous determination: a firms' entrenchment 
score at IPO cannot itself be the result of CEO compensation several years after IPO.  
Finally, moving beyond determining whether entrenchment at IPO and/or its sub-
components, internal and external entrenchment, affect components of CEO pay, I plan to 
assess how entrenchment affects the efficacy of performance measures in the design of 
the CEO's compensation contract. Most studies on the effects of particular corporate 
governance characteristics on executive compensation test whether the variable of 
interest has an effect on components of compensation. However, relatively little attention 
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is given to considering how the observed effect comes about. A notable exception is 
Davila and Penalva (2006) who find that compensation contracts in firms with inferior 
governance are associated with increased use of accounting-based performance measures. 
Their composite measure of “total” governance does not allow one to assess the specific 
mechanism at work, however, which makes it difficult to interpret the results. In a related 
study, Kren and Kerr (1997) appraise how the percentage of outside directors and board 
ownership affects the relationship between CEO compensation and performance 
measures. Their findings again lack a good explanation, in part because their theoretical 
framework runs contrary to standard agency theoretical predictions. Their study 
nevertheless informs my methodological approach.  
Along the lines of this group of studies, I will present analyses exploring the 
effect of entrenchment at IPO on the sensitivity of CEO compensation to changes in 
market- and accounting based performance measures, i.e., CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. While certain expectations can be formulated in this respect, I consider the 
exact relationship, if any, between levels of entrenchment and pay-for-performance 
sensitivity an open research question: Does entrenchment strengthen or weaken the 
connection between performance and compensation? Are accounting- or market-based 
performance measures more prone to being affected by entrenchment? It may not be 
possible to answer all of these questions fully in this study alone, but even partial answers 
will enrich the interpretation of the primary results.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant literature focusing on studies that relate firms' corporate governance 
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characteristics to executive compensation. Particular attention is thereby given to those 
studies that consider this relationship in the context of entrepreneurial firms. In chapter 3 
I outline the theoretical basis of the study and formulate my research hypotheses. Chapter 
4 identifies the data sources, defines the variables and addresses variable measurement 
issues. It also contains the research methodology and empirical models. Chapter 5 
presents the result of executing my research approach. The concluding Chapter 6 







This study is motivated by the literature on executive compensation and corporate 
governance, specifically shareholder rights and takeover defenses, and fits best with 
existent research assessing the effect of firms' governance characteristics on the 
compensation contracts of executives.  
CEO compensation has become a popular area of research in accounting, finance, 
economics, and organizational behavior over the past two decades, in part due to the 
increased availability of data in machine-readable form. Business research on CEO 
compensation has grown from about 1-2 published papers per year prior to 1985 to sixty 
published papers in 1995 (Murphy, 1999). The contemporaneous debate whether CEO 
compensation is excessive (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005) or justified, either because of 
company performance (Murphy, 1999) or specifics of the labor market for CEOs 
(Himmelberg and Hubbard, 2000), continues to fuel academic interest in this area.  
Accounting research on CEO compensation focuses predominantly on the 
relationship between CEO compensation and company performance (Murphy, 1985; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Abowd, 1990), including comparisons of the relevance of 
accounting-based versus stock-based performance measures for CEO pay, e.g., Baiman 
and Verrecchia (1995), Sloan (1993), Lambert and Larcker (1988). Early on, accounting 
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research also explored whether accounting-based bonuses lead managers to manipulate 
earnings (Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995).  
The second stream of research motivating my study is corporate governance. 
Corporate governance mechanisms may be defined as economic or legal institutions that 
can be altered through the political process (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Contributions to 
the study of firms' corporate governance are not limited to accounting, but also come 
from finance, economics, law, and other disciplines. The financial scandals of the early 
2000s and the subsequent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act continue to fan the research 
interest in governance issues. Accounting research on corporate governance is 
predominantly concerned with two topics: the relationship between governance and either 
firm value or firm performance, and the effect of governance on incidents of fraud, 
accounting restatements, or abnormal accruals. Measures for firms' corporate governance 
quality have been based on a large spectrum of distinct concepts such as board 
characteristics (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Beasley, 1996; Core, et al., 1999), audit 
committee characteristics (Abbott, Park, and Parker, 2000), compensation committee 
characteristics (Conyon and He, 2004), director characteristics (Core and Guay, 1999), 
inside ownership (Kren and Kerr, 1997), institutional ownership (Hartzell and Starks, 
2003), broad-based indices of charter and bylaw provisions affecting shareholder rights 
(Gompers et al., 2003), and takeover defenses (Daines and Klausner, 2001; Field and 
Karpoff, 2002). Most recently, Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) show that the 
prolificacy of inconsistent results between firms' corporate governance characteristics and 
accounting and economic outcomes can be attributed to the generally modest levels of 
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reliability and lack of construct validity of the various measures of "governance quality" 
employed in existent literature. Their paper motivates my extended analysis exploring the 
incremental effects of components of entrenchment vis-à-vis the effects of my composite 
measure of total entrenchment. 
The pertinent literature at the intersection of corporate governance and executive 
compensation research can be categorized roughly into three groups according to the 
specific governance characteristics hypothesized to affect executive compensation. The 
largest group of studies focuses on how characteristics of the board of directors affect 
executive compensation (e.g., Core et al. 1999). Another equally dominant research 
stream centers on the efficacy of ownership structures in the design of executive 
compensation contracts (e.g., Cyert al., 2002). Relatively few studies make up the third 
group, which addresses the impact of legal characteristics such as shareholder rights or 
takeover protection on compensation contracts (e.g., Fahlenbrach, 2008). It is within this 
third research stream that my study fits best, and it is this group of studies that constitutes 
the core of the relevant literature surveyed in this section. However, since studies on the 
effect of board characteristics or ownership structure form the preponderance of 
published research on the effect of governance characteristics on executive 
compensation, I briefly review key studies from these two domains to the extent that I 
draw on them for motivation, theoretical underpinnings, and methodological approach. 
Studies on the link between board characteristics and executive compensation 
have shown that compensation is higher when the board is relatively weak or ineffectual. 
Core et al. (1999), who present the landmark study, show that, controlling for economic 
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determinants of compensation, CEO compensation is higher: (1) when the board is large; 
(2) when more of the outside directors have been appointed by the CEO; (3) when 
outside directors serve on three or more boards; (4) when a higher percentage of "gray" 
directors serves on the board; (5) when directors are older; and (6) when the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board. Interestingly, however, Core et al. do not find evidence that 
outside directors are better monitors of management than inside directors. Similarly, 
Yermack (1996) and Cyert et al. (2002) also find no evidence of an association between 
CEO compensation and the fraction of outside directors on the board, while Mehran 
(1995) demonstrates that the percentage of annual compensation that is equity-based 
increases with the fraction of outside directors. Hermalin and Weissbach (2003) present a 
general overview of the literature on board characteristics and point out two primary 
weaknesses of this stream of literature: joint determination (endogeneity) of the board 
characteristics and the variable of interest, which is not always taken into account, and 
the frequently unclear stance on whether the findings represent equilibrium or out-of-
equilibrium phenomena. The research on board characteristics provides important 
motivation for my study. Specifically, the relationship between the quality of board 
monitoring and executive compensation has been a primary testing ground of agency 
theoretical predictions, which also form the core of my theoretical framework delineated 
in Chapter 3. I also draw heavily from this research stream with respect to my model 
specifications and choice of control variables as discussed in Chapter 4. 
The effect of governance on executive compensation has also been studied with a 
focus on ownership characteristics. With respect to insider ownership, CEO 
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compensation has been found to be a decreasing function of the equity held by the CEO, 
and CEO compensation is lower when there is a member on the board other than the CEO 
who owns at least 5% of the shares (Core et al., 1999). With respect to outside ownership, 
Cyert et al. (2002) find a negative correlation of the equity ownership of the largest 
shareholder and the level of salary, equity, and discretionary compensation. Doubling the 
percentage ownership of the outside shareholder reduces non-salary compensation by 
about 12-14 percent. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that the CEO in firms that 
lack a 5 percent (or larger) external shareholder tend to receive more “luck-based” 
compensation, i.e., compensation associated with profit due to factors outside of the 
manager's control, such as changes in oil prices and exchange rates. Similarly, Hartzell 
and Starks (2003) present evidence that concentrated institutional ownership is associated 
with lower executive compensation. These results are consistent with closer monitoring 
of executives' actions in the presence of a large outside shareholder.  
Kren and Kerr (1997) study how board members' stock ownership and the 
proportion of outsiders on the board moderate the weight of accounting- and market-
based performance measures in CEO compensation contracts. This study provides my 
primary impetus for considering how entrenchment affects the design of the CEO’s 
compensation contracts as reflected in pay-for-performance sensitivity. Kren and Kerr 
find that firms with higher equity ownership of board members tie CEO compensation 
more closely to both accounting and market returns. This finding runs contrary to 
standard agency theory, which predicts that weaker (and not stronger) governance is 
associated with increased use of performance measures in the design of compensation 
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contracts of executives. However, they also find that the proportion of outside directors 
serving on the board was associated with significantly decreased use of market returns in 
CEO compensation. Thus, results on the effect of governance characteristics on pay-for 
performance sensitivity are mixed in this study. As Kren and Kerr, I use the interaction 
term of entrenchment with accounting- and market-based performance measures as a 
primary test of the effect of entrenchment on pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
Finally, a limited number of studies have examined the relationship between 
corporate governance and executive compensation with a focus on legal determinants of 
governance. My measure of entrenchment at IPO is based on state-level takeover statutes 
and firm-level charter provisions with an arguable effect on levels of takeover protection 
and shareholder rights. Accordingly, studies on the effect of takeover legislation or 
entrenching charter provisions on executives' compensation contracts are of primary 
importance for my study. Only a few studies have explored this connection.  
Bertrand and Mullainathan (1998) present the primary study exploring the effect 
of anti-takeover legislation on executive compensation. Drawing on a sample of 611 
firms during the years 1984-1991, they assess how the adoption of three typical anti-
takeover laws in certain states (namely, control share acquisition statutes, fair price 
statutes, and business combination statutes1) affected CEO compensation. They find that 
mean CEO total pay and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity increased following the 
passage of the three statutes under consideration. However, their results on CEO pay-for-
 




performance sensitivity must be interpreted with caution due to their uncommon model 
specification, which is based on levels rather than changes in CEO total compensation. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan argue that the effect of takeover measures on CEO 
compensation may support both an optimal contracting model of CEO pay, as well as a 
"skimming model" in which reduced takeover fears enable executives to extract excess 
rents. Based on supplemental analyses they conclude that increases in mean pay surpass 
levels that would be expected under the optimal contracting view thus lending more 
credence to a skimming explanation for their results. 
Similarly, Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2005) show that CEOs reduced their share 
holdings by an average of 15 percent, when their firms were protected by state anti-
takeover legislation. Their study was based on Forbes 500 firms and considered takeover 
legislation enacted during the period from 1984 to 1991. The results corroborate Bertrand 
and Mullainathan’s findings. Together, these two studies provide conclusive evidence for 
the relevance not only of measures adopted at the firm level, but also of state-level 
regulation with a bearing on the ease of corporate takeovers.  
I include all three statutory provisions considered by Bertrand and Mullainathan 
in my entrenchment measure. A priori, however, the exact effect of these laws on 
executive compensation is not clear, however, for my sample period 1996 to 2002. 
Specifically, fair price and business combination statutes were deemed important in the 
late 1980s (Bebchuk et al., 2005). However, Delaware courts began legalizing the poison 
pill in a series of cases starting with the 1985 landmark decision Moran v. Household 
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International.2 Currently, firms' ability to maintain a pill indefinitely may render the 
incremental effect of share acquisition statutes, fair price statutes, and business 
combination statutes on takeover protection insignificant. On the other hand, Bebchuk 
and Cohen (2003) show that the presence or absence of these statutes continues to be an 
appreciable factor in firms' decision where to incorporate. 
Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997) study executive compensation in 
firms that adopt two types of charter provisions with entrenching effects in the period 
from 1979 to 1987: supermajority requirements for the approval of mergers and fair price 
provisions. Using a matched sample of 129 firms, they find that firms adopting these 
provisions display higher CEO cash compensation in the year of adoption and the 
subsequent three years when compared with companies that did not adopt these 
provisions. Furthermore, they show that CEOs of firms with these charter amendments 
consistently receive compensation in excess of market compensation as measured by the 
difference between actual compensation and compensation predicted by a regression 
model including various known determinants of executive compensation. They interpret 
these results as evidence for the entrenching effect of charter provisions enabling CEOs 
to extract excess compensation.  
Aggarwal and Knoeber (1998) study the effect of takeover threats on CEO 
compensation. They proxy for the threat of a takeover using the actual industry incidence 
of takeovers as well as the actual incidence of the firm being taken over within a 
predetermined time period. They argue that increased takeover threats exercise two 
 
2 Moran v. Household International, 490 A.2d 1059 (Del., 1985).  
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opposing effects on CEO compensation: a labor market competition effect, which reduces 
levels of compensation because more competitive environment restrains managers' ability 
to extract excess rents, and a risk of lost compensation effect, which increases 
compensation because managers may need to be compensated for the increased risk of 
forfeiting components of long-term pay in a high takeover threat environment. Using 
cross-sectional data, Aggarwal and Knoeber do not find that their proxies for takeover 
threats are associated with CEO compensation (salary plus bonus). However, when 
assessing the differential impact of their takeover threat measures on CEO compensation 
in firms where the CEO is protected by a golden parachute agreement, they find that both 
effects are present but that the risk of lost compensation effect dominates such that higher 
takeover threats are associated with increased compensation. Aggarwal and Knoeber's 
results are difficult to interpret since the proclivity for corporate takeovers in a given 
industry may not be a good proxy for the actual takeover threat faced by an individual 
firm within the given industry. Their study nevertheless provides important evidence of 
the relevance of takeover threats in the design of compensation contracts. Specifically, 
they show that the presence of golden parachute agreements, one of the firm-level 
provisions considered in this study, affects levels of CEO cash compensation.  
Research on statutory law and firms' charter provisions affecting corporate 
governance received a significant boost through the work of Gompers et al. (2003). 
Gompers et al. construct a corporate governance index (the G-index) to measure the 
overall balance between shareholder and insider rights. The G-Index is based on data 
reported by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). The IRRC reports data 
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on twenty-four governance provisions that are rooted in the state legal environment, 
corporate charter, or bylaws, and that appear advantageous to management. Gompers et 
al. show that a broad index of the IRRC provisions,3 giving each provision equal weight, 
is negatively correlated with firm value (Tobin’s Q) and stockholder returns. 
In a related study, Bebchuk et al. (2005) develop an entrenchment index (the E-
Index), which is based on a selective subset of six out of the twenty-four IRRC 
governance provisions. Four of the six provisions are charter or bylaw stipulations 
affecting shareholders' voting rights (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements 
for charter amendments). The remaining two are “takeover readiness” provisions that 
boards put in place to protect themselves in case of a hostile takeover (poison pills and 
golden parachutes). Bebchuk et al. show that the provisions contained in the E-Index 
fully drive the correlation between the G-Index and reduced firm value and lower stock 
returns. In addition, they find no evidence that any of the other eighteen IRRC provisions 
excluded from their E-Index are negatively correlated with either firm value or stock 
returns. They therefore conclude that any entrenching effect of charter provisions must be 
entirely due to takeover defenses and restrictions on shareholder voting power. 
Both the G-index and E-index have recently been used to study the effects of 
shareholder rights on executive compensation. Fahlenbrach (2008) finds that firms with 
 
3 These provisions are: anti-greenmail, blank check preferred stock, business combination laws, bylaw and 
charter amendment limitations, classified board, compensation plans with change in control provisions, 
director indemnification contracts, control share, cash-out laws, cumulative voting requirements, director’s 
duties, fair price requirements, golden parachutes, director indemnification, limitations on director liability, 
pension parachutes, poison pills, secret ballot, executive severance agreements, silver parachutes, special 
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weaker shareholder rights as measured by the G- Index have CEOs who are paid more 
and have less pay-for-performance sensitivity. These results hold if the G-Index is 
replaced with the E-Index or a sub-index of the G-Index containing takeover defenses 
only. Based on supplemental analysis, Fahlenbrach concludes that his results are 
consistent with an optimal contracting view of executive compensation. In a closely 
related study, Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson (2005) confirm that CEOs of firms where 
shareholder rights are weak (per the G-Index) obtain more favorable compensation. They 
also find that when shareholder rights are weak, CEOs are able to demand higher pay 
when shareholder wealth increases, but when shareholder wealth decreases there is no 
corresponding decline in CEO compensation. Accordingly, they interpret their results as 
confirming rent expropriation rather than optimal contracting. While significant 
differences in models and methodology exist between these two studies, the difference in 
findings is striking given that both studies are based on ExecuComp and IRRC data, use 
virtually the same sample, and focus on the same variable of interest, the G-Index.  
The G-Index is also used in the study of Davila and Penalva (2006), who assess 
how governance affects the implicit weights on accounting- and market-based 
performance measures in CEO compensation contracts. Thus, their study is related to 
Kren and Kerr (1997). Davila and Penalva discuss the importance of internal and external 
governance measures for total governance but employ a single composite measure of 
governance based on the G-Index, an indicator variable for CEO/Chairman of the board 
identity, the proportion of inside directors, and the number of board meetings per year. 
 
meeting requirements, supermajority requirements, unequal voting rights and limitations on action by 
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They report a positive and significant interaction effect of their governance variable with 
accounting performance (QROA). Davila and Penalva infer that weaker governance 
enables CEOs to influence their compensation contracts such that increased weight is 
based on accounting performance. I do not concur with this interpretation. Increased use 
of performance-based compensation in the presence of weak governance is in keeping 
with standard agency theoretical predictions of optimal contracting. Their explanation of 
managerial rent seeking through increased use of accounting performance measures thus 
warrants additional analysis. Specifically, Davila and Penalva do not establish that the 
increased use of accounting performance measures results in higher pay for the executive 
and do not present evidence why CEO would want to tilt their compensation contracts 
towards increased use of accounting performance measures.  
All of the studies in this last group are important, since they highlight the 
relevance of shareholder rights in the design of compensation contracts. However, 
"shareholder rights" as captured in the G-Index may be too broad (or vague) of a concept 
to serve as a starting point for a compelling story of the relationship between managerial 
power and executive compensation. While these studies greatly inform the theoretical 
underpinnings, hypotheses development, and methodological approach of my study, they 
also differ from mine in the following ways. I move away decisively from "lumped" 
governance measures of various shareholder rights, such as the G- or E-Index, and use a 
comprehensive measure for a much tighter concept "entrenchment." I examine the long-





studies focus on the contemporaneous relationship between some governance measure 
and executive pay in established firms. As well, I explore the effect of entrenchment 
more deeply by differentiating incremental effects of external and internal entrenchment 
and by assessing the effect of entrenchment on the weighting of performance measures in 





I posit that entrenchment at IPO has long-ranging effects on the severity of 
principle-agent problems in a firm as evidenced by systematic long-term effects on levels 
of CEO compensation as well as on CEOs' pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
As Gompers et al. (2003) have put it: corporations are republics. The ultimate 
responsibility in all affairs of the firm rests with the owners, i.e., the shareholders. The 
shareholders elect representatives, a Board of Directors, to exercise oversight over the 
corporation in their place. The directors in turn hire the firm's executives to run the day-
to-day business. The balance of power between the insiders of the corporation, i.e., the 
directors and executives of the firm, on the one hand, and the shareholders, on the other 
hand, depends on the specific rules governing the internal relations of the corporation. 
These rules are contained in the firm's corporate charters and bylaws and also depend on 
the corporate laws of the state of incorporation.  
All rules relevant to the governance of the firm are initially determined at IPO. 
Prior to going public, firms review and revise their choice of general legal environment 
and select a state of incorporation. The percentage of IPO firms incorporating in a state 
other than their home state was 67% and 75% for the periods 1991 to 1995 and 1996 to 
2000, respectively (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003). The low percentage of home-state 
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incorporations suggests that firms optimize their legal environment prior to going public. 
Furthermore, when going public, firms adopt new charters to facilitate the transition from 
a privately owned, closely controlled entity to a public firm with dispersed ownership. 
The corporate charter prior to going public is drafted by the majority of the original 
owners of the firm at the time. The firm's pre-IPO insiders are therefore in the unique 
position to affect the future effectiveness of shareholder and market control over 
management by setting charter provisions and selecting state anti-takeover protection at a 
level consistent with their own preferences. These considerations support a measure of 
entrenchment at IPO that is based on a combination of firm-level charter provisions 
affecting shareholder rights and takeover probability and state-level anti-takeover 
protection attained through incorporation into a particular state.  
Furthermore, while changes to the rules governing shareholder-insider relations 
could be made with the majority vote of the shareholders, evidence exists that there is 
little year-to-year variation in firms' charter provisions affecting shareholder rights after 
IPO. Gompers et al. (2003) observe a mean change of only 0.60 for individual firms in 
the twenty-four provisions that constitute their G-Index between publication dates of 
governance data in the IRRC database (e.g., 1990, 1993, 1995, and 1998). The reported 
median change of the G-Index between publication dates is zero. Since there are 
generally three years between each publication of governance data by the IRRC, a 0.60 
mean change in governance provisions in between publication dates indicates that firms 
on average add or drop one of the twenty-four items that make up the G-index every five 
years. The median firm does not change its governance posture at all. Additional 
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evidence comes from Field and Karpoff (2002), who focus on IPO firms' use of takeover 
defenses. In their sample of 1,019 firms going public between 1988 and 1992, they find 
an estimated unconditional rate of change in takeover defenses for the first five years 
after IPO of 2.2 percent. Specifically, they find that the average number of new poison 
pills or staggered boards, two primary items of importance included in my entrenchment 
measure, adopted during the first five years after IPO is very low (0.04). Taken together, 
this evidence indicates that there is a meaningful amount of stability in firms' governance 
posture taken at IPO. 
To date, no previous study of which I am aware assesses the effect of 
entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation. This is surprising because existing evidence 
on firms’ corporate governance decisions at IPO is ambiguous. Based on standard 
agency-theoretical predictions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) firms going public should be 
expected to adopt optimal governance structures, designed to minimize agency costs 
thereby maximizing firm value. This expectation is convincing because the existing 
shareholders, i.e., the pre-IPO corporate insiders, bear the cost of suboptimal governance 
and therefore should have a strong incentive to optimize the governance structure when 
going public (Baker and Gompers, 2003). Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) express this 
expectation as a statement of fact, albeit without presenting evidence: “Firms go public in 
easy to acquire form: no poison pill securities, no supermajority rules or staggered 
boards.” 
By contrast, Brennan and Franks (1997) argue that firms’ insiders 
opportunistically take steps at IPO to ensure that they will maintain their private benefits 
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of control after the firm’s stock is publicly traded. Daines and Klausner (2001) examine 
whether IPO firms' use of anti-takeover measures is consistent with two primary 
efficiency explanations of takeover protection. Stein (1988) argues that takeover defenses 
decrease managerial myopia because a reduced threat of replacement may reduce 
managements concern about short-term goals and facilitate optimal investment in long-
term projects. Stulz (1988) posits that takeover defenses improve firms' bargaining power 
in takeover situations and enable management to negotiate higher takeover premiums. 
Daines and Klausner do not find that the pattern of adoption of takeover defenses by IPO 
firms is consistent with either of these two alternative explanations and conclude that 
firms adopt takeover measures for purposes of insider entrenchment, thus, confirming 
Brennan and Frank's proposition. Field and Karpoff (2002) present similar evidence. 
Taken together, the findings on IPO firms' adoption of entrenching provisions, 
particularly anti-takeover measures, appear consistent with insiders' desire to protect their 
private benefits of control post-IPO. Thus, studying the effect of entrenchment at IPO on 
post-IPO CEO compensation is a logical extension. 
Two conflicting theories predict the effect of entrenchment at IPO on the design 
of executive compensation contracts: the "optimal contracting" theory and the 
"managerial power" theory. Both theories are grounded in principle-agent theory. 
Principal-agent theory was first put forward by Berle and Means (1932) and formalized 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980). According to agency theory, the 
managers of a corporation run the business as "agents" for the owners of the corporation, 
i.e., shareholders. The "agency problem" stems from the potential for management to 
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serve its own self-interest in managing the business at the expense of the owners. So far, 
the optimal contracting and managerial power view of compensation are in agreement. 
The two views differ, however, in their assessment of the role of executive compensation 
contracts with reference to agency problems. 
According to the optimal contracting view, executive compensation arrangements 
serve as a remedy to agency problems. Shareholders (the principal) will alleviate agency 
problems by designing an optimal compensation contract, which includes an appropriate 
incentive pay structure to align management's (the agent's) interest with their own. 
Analytical papers have demonstrated that components of compensation contracts are 
substitutes (e.g., Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). Specifically, 
incentive pay and the principal’s direct monitoring of the agent's performance work as 
substitute mechanisms, which jointly contribute to the alleviation of the agency problem. 
If one dimension of incentives is weak, then the principal must increase the proportion of 
other incentive devices to establish an overall optimal level of incentives. Monitoring 
strength and incentive pay are, thus, inversely related, so that even if direct monitoring of 
the agent’s effort is weak, the overall compensation package is still set at the optimal 
level with higher proportions of performance-based pay compensating for the lower 
quality of direct monitoring (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Murphy, 1985).  
Entrenchment insulates firms' insiders from the disciplinary threat of intervention 
or removal by shareholders and reduces the probability of an ouster through a successful 
corporate takeover. Thus, under the optimal-contracting view of compensation contracts, 
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the reduced effectiveness of corrective action by shareholders or the market for corporate 
control should be offset by increased pay-for-performance sensitivity. As the threat of 
termination becomes a less feasible device to motivate management to act in the best 
interest of shareholders, higher proportions of executive pay must be tied to the 
achievement of performance goals to address the principal-agent problem. This "optimal 
contracting" or "substitution" perspective of compensation contracts is the prevalent view 
held by financial economists and often represents a maintained hypothesis (see, e.g., 
Core, Guay and Verrechia, 2003).  
In contrast, proponents of the alternate "managerial power" view (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003) argue that entrenchment enables managers to influence their compensation 
contracts so that these contracts do not reflect optimal incentive levels, but rather 
managerial preference. According to this view, entrenchment leads to a permanent shift 
in bargaining power over the rents of the company. Thus, on the basis of the managerial 
power view, executive compensation is not only regarded as a remedial instrument for 
addressing agency problems but also as part of an agency problem, i.e., an agency cost.  
A number of studies support this view. Ljungqvist and Habib (2003) examine the 
effect of option grants on shareholder value and find that CEOs receive too many options; 
the marginal incentive benefit of the last option is less than the cost to shareholders. In 
other words, shareholder value would increase if the number of options held by CEOs 
were reduced, holding everything else constant. This finding is difficult to reconcile with 
optimal contracting but is consistent with the presence of managerial power and rent 
extraction. Other studies documenting evidence of features of executive compensation 
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contracts consistent with the managerial power view include Yermack, 1995 and 1997, 
and Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001.  
To summarize, both the optimal contracting and managerial power views of 
executive compensation contracts are based on standard agency theory. The two views 
conflict but represent complements rather than alternatives (Jiraporn et al., 2005). Market 
forces, emphasized by optimal contracting, drive compensation toward value-
maximizing, optimal outcomes, whereas managerial self-interest exercises a force toward 
sub-optimal outcomes favored by management. As such, the managerial power view 
recognizes that these forces are significant and that compensation contracts cannot be 
explained adequately by optimal contracting alone (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
The optimal contracting and managerial power perspectives lead to different 
expectations about the effect of insider entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation as 
discussed in the context of each of the following hypotheses. Considering the evidence 
presented by Bebchuk and Fried (2003), Daines and Klausner (2001), and Field and 
Karpoff (2002), who find that managers take steps at the time of the IPO to ensure the 
continuation of their private benefits of control, I believe a priori that the relationship 
between entrenchment at IPO and CEO compensation is more consistent with the 
managerial power perspective. Therefore, I formulate my hypotheses consistent with the 
managerial power view. Table 1 contains a summary of the expected effects adopting 
either the optimal contracting or the managerial power view. 
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Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Compensation 
The managerial-power theory asserts that entrenchment will increase the CEO’s 
bargaining power and influence over his or her compensation contract and, thus, enable 
the extraction of excess rents. Assuming risk-aversion, CEOs will prefer cash 
compensation to riskier performance-based compensation. The managerial power 
perspective therefore suggests that entrenchment at IPO will enable CEOs to demand a 
larger portion of their pay in cash. Conversely, the optimal-contracting theory posits that 
firms will react to the reduction in direct monitoring effectiveness by substituting away 
from fixed components of compensation. Thus, the managerial power and optimal 
contracting theories predict opposite effects on the levels of cash compensation. In 
accordance with the managerial power view, I expect entrenchment at IPO to be 
associated with higher levels of CEO cash compensation.  
H1a:  Insider entrenchment at IPO is positively related to CEO cash 
compensation. 
Optimal contracting predicts increased use of performance-based pay in response 
to the reduction in shareholders' direct control over management. Accordingly, under 
optimal-contracting, increased grants of stock-based compensation are expected to 
facilitate alignment of shareholder and management interests. The effect of entrenchment 
on the levels of stock-based compensation under managerial-power, however, is less 
clear. It is possible that insiders use their increased influence over their compensation 
contracts to reduce their compensation risk by substituting higher cash compensation for 
riskier stock-based compensation. In this case, reduced or unaffected levels of stock-
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based compensation would accompany increased levels of cash pay. On the other hand, 
extreme managerial power may enable insiders to demand higher cash pay without 
sacrificing levels of stock-based compensation. While a negative or non-significant 
relationship between entrenchment and stock-based compensation would not contradict 
managerial power, a positive and significant effect in the presence of an also positive and 
significant effect on cash compensation would strongly support the managerial power 
perspective. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) supply evidence consistent with the latter 
expectation.  
H1b:  Insider entrenchment at IPO is positively related to CEO stock-based 
compensation. 
H1b is an important building block to assess the effects of entrenchment at IPO. 
However, since a positive effect of entrenchment on stock-based compensation may be 
consistent with either the optimal-contracting or managerial power perspectives, 
hypothesis H1b cannot by itself serve as a test to discriminate between the two competing 
explanations. It must be interpreted in context with the results for the other hypotheses. 
The expected effect of entrenchment on levels of total compensation is 
straightforward. Executives' influence over their own compensation contracts should 
result in higher levels of total compensation. Under optimal contracting, however, no 
such one-dimensional expectation exists. The optimal contracting view predicts that 
entrenchment will trigger increased emphasis of performance-based components in the 
compensation contract to substitute for the reduced effectiveness of direct monitoring. 
However, firms may have to compensate risk-averse CEOs with higher compensation for 
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the increase in firm-specific risk borne by the executives as a consequence of the 
increased proportion of stock-based pay. Thus, from the perspective of managerial power, 
the effect of entrenchment at IPO on the level of total compensation is predictably 
positive. From the perspective of optimal contracting, the effect is ambiguous. A positive 
effect on levels of total compensation may or may not exist. Therefore, the level of total 
compensation again cannot serve as a test to differentiate between the two viewpoints 
unless interpreted in context. Based on the managerial power perspective, I expect a 
positive relation between entrenchment at IPO and total CEO compensation. 
H1c:  Insider entrenchment at IPO is positively related to CEO total 
compensation. 
Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Compensation over Time 
To assess the long-term effects of entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation 
contracts, I examine the differential effect of the entrenchment posture taken at IPO on 
CEO compensation for five years post-IPO. The primary objective of this set of 
hypotheses is to establish the importance of governance decisions at IPO as reflected in 
their long-term effect on executive pay. The question of interest is whether the effect of 
entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation (if any) is consistent, decreasing, or even 
increasing over time. Based on the managerial-power perspective, entrenchment causes a 
permanent increase in insiders’ influence over their compensation contracts. If 
entrenchment bears out as a permanent shift in bargaining power over the rents of the 
corporation, then the effect of entrenchment at IPO on cash, stock-based, and total CEO 
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pay in the post-IPO years should be constant. Basing my expectations again on the 
managerial-power perspective, I thus conjecture: 
H2a:  The positive association of insider entrenchment at IPO with CEO cash 
compensation is constant over time. 
H2b:  The positive association of insider entrenchment at IPO with CEO stock-
based compensation is constant over time. 
H2c:  The positive association of insider entrenchment at IPO with CEO total 
compensation is constant over time. 
Studying a possible time-effect in entrenchment may also provide additional 
evidence enabling differentiation between the managerial power and optimal contracting 
views. Under optimal contracting, levels of entrenchment at IPO, which have been 
exogenously determined by the corporate insiders prior to going public, should be 
incorporated over time into an optimal contract structure such that the effect of 
entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation, if any, should not persist. Accordingly, 
substitution of pay components should show in a decreased use of cash-based 
compensation and an increased use of stock-based compensation over time. As discussed 
in the context of hypothesis H1c above, the effect of entrenchment on total compensation 
over time, however, is ambiguous because of the potential need to compensate the 
executive for increased sharing of the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. It will be necessary to 
consider the results for all hypotheses jointly to assess whether the evidence is more 
consistent with one or the other theory. 
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Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
Optimal contracting theory predicts increased use of market or accounting-based 
performance measures in the design of the executive’s compensation package in the 
presence of entrenchment. More of the executive’s compensation should be tied to the 
attainment of performance goals to substitute for the relative weakness of direct 
monitoring. I assess the strength of the tie between pay and performance by investigating 
the degree to which changes in compensation are driven by changes in firm performance. 
A stronger association between changes in CEO's total and cash compensation and 
market- and accounting-based performance measures should be observable in the 
presence of entrenchment. No such prediction exists based on the managerial-power 
view. On the contrary, extreme managerial power suggests a negative effect of 
entrenchment on the relationship between accounting- and market-based performance 
measures and changes in CEO compensation consistent with an increased ability of 
entrenched executives to disconnect their pay increases (or decreases) from increases or 
decreases in firm performance. Accordingly, based on the managerial-power perspective 
and the preceding argument, I hypothesize: 
H3a:  Insider entrenchment at IPO is associated negatively with the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of CEO cash compensation. 
H3b:  Insider entrenchment at IPO is associated negatively with the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of CEO total compensation. 
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Summary of Hypotheses 
The following table summarizes the hypotheses and respective expectations under 
the managerial power and optimal contracting views of executive compensation 
contracts.  





In this section, I first discuss my data sources and sample selection criteria. Next, 
I present variables and variable measurement separately for the dependent variables 
(compensation variables), the independent variables of primary interest (entrenchment 
variables), and other independent variables (control variables). Appendix C contains a 
summary of the variable descriptions. I conclude by outlining my estimation 
methodology and introducing the statistical models. 
Data Sources  
To test the hypotheses on the effect of insider entrenchment at IPO on CEO 
compensation, I use data from a sample of US firms completing an initial public offering 
in the years 1996 to 2002. Data availability and the necessity to combine data from a 
number of different sources put restrictions on the construction of the sample and also 
dictate the time frame of 1996-2002.  
Data on entrenchment at IPO are primarily collected from the corporate charters 
and bylaws. These documents are included as an appendix to the firm's S-1 registration 
statement filed with the SEC prior to the initial public offering of shares. Additional data 
on entrenchment and firm and executive characteristics prior to IPO come from the firms’ 
IPO prospectus. Registration statements and IPO prospectuses are available on EDGAR. 
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Companies were phased into filing on EDGAR over a three-year period ending on May 
6, 1996. My sample is, therefore, restricted to firms going public in the year 1996 or later. 
Furthermore, since I assess the effect of entrenchment at IPO on future CEO 
compensation for a time period of five years post-IPO, I cannot include firms going 
public after 2002 to ensure the availability of data for at least five years after IPO. 
Compensation information comes from companies’ annual proxy statement (SEC 
form DEF14A). Standard and Poor’s maintains a machine-readable database, 
ExecuComp, which contains compilations of compensation data and related information 
from the annual proxy statements. I rely on ExecuComp data to the extent possible and 
require availability of compensation data in this database for at least some years. If 
compensation data is not available for the entire first five years post-IPO, I supplement 
with hand-collected data from the DEF14A forms. Firm financial information is extracted 
from Compustat; stock price information comes from the CRSP monthly data files. Thus, 
coverage in three databases is required for firms to be included in my sample: 
ExecuComp, Compustat, and CRSP. Details of my sample construction, the sample 
description, and analysis addressing potential concerns of sample selection bias are 
included in the Sample Selection and Description section in the Empirical Results and 
Analysis chapter.  
Dependent Variables: CEO Compensation  
Following studies such as Core et al. (1999), Engel et al. (2002), or Bebchuk and 
Grinstein (2005), I analyze annual total CEO compensation (TCOMP) and, separately, its 
two key components cash compensation (CASHCOMP) and stock-based compensation 
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(STOCKCOMP). Data for the computation of these variables come from the ExecuComp 
database or from the company’s annual DEF14A proxy statement. 
My primary operationalization of CEO cash compensation is based on the sum of 
the CEO’s annual salary and bonus (CASHCOMPb) (Core, Guay, and Verrecchia, 2003; 
Sloan, 1993). However, for a test of robustness, I define cash compensation alternatively 
as the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash pay (CASHCOMPc) (Murphy, 1999), 
and salary only (CASHCOMPa). STOCKCOMP equals the sum of the value of annual 
grants of stock options and restricted stock. The value of restricted stock grants is as 
reported by the company in its annual DEF14A proxy statement. I determine the value of 
annual stock option grants using a modified Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation 
methodology. Modifications relate to simplifying assumptions with respect to the grant 
date and holding term of options and adjustments to account for extreme volatilities and 
dividend yields. Details on my modified Black-Scholes option valuation methodology, 
which parallels the methodology on which Black-Scholes values reported in ExecuComp 
are based, are contained in Appendix B. TCOMP is the sum of salary, bonus, other 
annual (cash) pay, restricted stock grants, stock options grants, long-term incentive plan 
payouts, and all other pay. All compensation variables are adjusted to 1996 dollars using 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to 
control for inflation and log transformed to correct for skewness. 
Independent Variables: Entrenchment at IPO 
My measure of entrenchment at IPO combines six firm level and five state law 
provisions. The selection of these eleven items is based on the premise that entrenchment 
39 
 
of insiders comes about by a reduction in the effectiveness of monitoring by the 
company’s shareholders, i.e., internal entrenchment, and by a reduction in the 
effectiveness of market monitoring, i.e., external entrenchment. In addition, I see 
entrenchment arising from a combination of legal provisions contained in the corporate 
charter and in the corporate laws in effect in the state of incorporation. 
At the firm level, there are six items that prior empirical evidence suggests are 
relevant in aiding insider entrenchment. These are the items that comprise the 
entrenchment index (E-Index) as described by Bebchuk et al. (2005). The E-Index is a 
shorter set of the governance index, the "G-Index," developed by Gompers et al. (2003). 
The G-Index contains twenty-four corporate governance provisions relating in the widest 
sense to shareholder rights. Bebchuk et al. find, however, that the results of previous 
studies that employed the G-Index are driven entirely by a sub-set of six items relating to 
entrenchment including: (1) staggered boards, (2) limitations on shareholders' ability to 
amend bylaws, (3) supermajority requirements for mergers, (4) supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments, (5) poison pills, and (6) golden parachutes. These 
provisions restrict shareholder rights and contribute to insider entrenchment as follows: 
Staggered Boards: When the board is staggered, directors are divided typically 
into three classes with only one class of directors coming up for reelection each year. As 
a result, shareholders are unable to replace an ineffective board at any given shareholder 
meeting. In the most typical case of the three classes of directors, it will take at least two 
annual shareholder meetings to replace a majority of the directors. 
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Supermajority Requirements for Bylaw Amendments: Shareholders have the 
power to vote to change the company bylaws, which contain various governance 
arrangements. In some companies, shareholders’ power to amend the bylaws is 
constrained by limits included in the corporate charter or in the bylaws themselves. Such 
limits usually take the form of supermajority requirements that can make it difficult, if 
not impossible, for shareholders to amass enough votes to pass a bylaw amendment 
opposed by management. Supermajority requirements are very effective in constraining 
shareholders’ voting power, because not all non-management shareholders are likely to 
participate in a vote, and management commonly commands or influences at least some 
votes. 
Supermajority Requirement for Charter Amendments: Shareholders have the 
power to vote to approve charter amendments. Some companies, however, limit the 
ability of shareholders to pass charter amendments by requiring a supermajority. In the 
presence of such provisions, management might be in a position to defeat or impede 
charter amendments, even if it loses control of the board.  
Supermajority Requirements for Mergers: Shareholders have the power to vote to 
approve mergers. Some companies, however, require a supermajority for the approval of 
mergers. As in the case of supermajority requirements for charter amendments, such 
provisions put management in a position to defeat mergers, even if control of the board is 
lost.  
Poison Pills: Poison pills, also known as shareholder rights plans, are warrants or 
rights which entitle their holders to receive significant value from the firm. Typically, 
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such plans allow shareholders to purchase shares at a discount without board approval. 
These rights are triggered and become exercisable in the event that a buyer obtains a 
significant block of shares beyond a predetermined threshold. Poison pills make hostile 
takeovers without the approval and collaboration of the incumbents prohibitively costly. 
Therefore, once issued by the company, poison pills preclude a hostile bidder as a 
practical matter from buying shares as long as the incumbents remain in office and refuse 
to neutralize the pill. Poison pills, thus, provide considerable protection against 
replacement. 
Golden Parachutes: Golden parachutes are terms in executive compensation 
agreements that provide executives with substantial monetary benefits in the case of 
termination due to a change in control. The effect of such arrangements is twofold. First, 
golden parachutes increase the cost of a takeover and, thus, decrease takeover probability. 
Second, golden parachute payouts provide incumbents with substantial insulation from 
the economic costs that they would bear otherwise as a result of losing control.  
The first four of these provisions infringe on shareholder control over 
management by restricting the effective exercise of voting rights. Shareholder voting 
power is ultimately the source of all of their power. Limitations on shareholder voting 
power over the affairs of the corporation, therefore, directly bear on the effectiveness of 
shareholder control and contribute to insider entrenchment by making it difficult to 
replace incumbent directors and to change the balance of power between shareholders 
and insiders determined at IPO.  
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The other two provisions, poison pills and golden parachutes, are important 
takeover readiness provisions that boards put in place in preparation for hostile takeover 
attempts. These provisions strongly affect takeover probability and, thus, contribute to 
entrenchment by reducing the effectiveness of market control over management. In this 
context, golden parachute agreements warrant a more detailed discussion. It has been 
argued that golden parachute agreements serve the interests of shareholders by inciting 
incumbents to readily accept acquisition attempts (Lambert and Larcker, 1985). 
However, I view golden parachute agreements, particularly those that have been drafted 
at IPO by the insiders of the firm, as being motivated by the desire to reduce the effects 
of market discipline for corporate control. The typical golden parachute agreement is 
quite unsophisticated and promises a substantial lump-sum payment and immediate 
vesting of options in the case of any change of control. If such agreements were part of an 
incentive scheme, I would expect parachute payouts to be tied more purposefully to the 
creation of shareholder value. Depending on the specific situation, of course, it is possible 
that golden parachute arrangements may incite management to take a positive stance 
towards takeovers as has been suggested by Lambert and Larcker. However, this does not 
contradict that such arrangements take the "threat" out of "termination threat" and thereby 
decrease the effectiveness of market control over management. 
In addition, varying degrees of takeover protection exist, depending on the state of 
incorporation. Evidence of the entrenching effect of state anti-takeover laws comes from 
the event study of Bertrand and Mullainathan (1998), who show that the adoption of state 
anti-takeover statutes results in increased executive compensation. Furthermore, Bebchuk 
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and Cohen (2003) show that states, which offer stronger anti-takeover protection, are 
substantially more successful in retaining in-state firms and in attracting out-of-state 
incorporations. This finding strongly suggests that a firm’s decision of where to 
incorporate is a conscious choice to avail itself of the legal regime in a particular state. 
Thus, if takeover likelihood and takeover cost depend on the state of incorporation’s 
stance as being friendly or unsympathetic towards hostile takeovers, then total external 
entrenchment is a joint function of firm-level and state law takeover protection.  
To capture differences in levels of state anti-takeover statutes, I rely on the items 
that make up the state anti-takeover protection index (API, Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003). 
The API is based on five standard takeover laws which any given state may or may not 
have adopted and includes: (1) control share acquisition statutes, (2) fair price statutes, 
(3) business combination statutes limiting freeze-outs, (4) poison pill endorsement, and 
(5) statutes allowing the interests of non-shareholders to be taken into account in the 
consideration of takeover bids. These provisions are explained in more detail in 
Appendix A.  
Some states allow firms to opt out of certain takeover protection statutes. For 
instance, Delaware law permits corporations to decline coverage under its business 
combination statute by electing to do so in their articles of incorporation. In determining 
whether firms are covered under a State's statutory provisions, I take such opt-out 
decisions into account.  
In sum, thus, I consider eleven items, which arguably contribute to entrenchment 
at IPO: six firm-level measures and five state takeover laws. Each of these items is coded 
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one if the provision is present, and zero otherwise. The entrenchment variable total 
entrenchment (ENT) is then computed based on the total number of firm or state-level 
entrenching provisions present in a given firm at IPO. The range of the entrenchment 
measures, therefore, is zero to eleven.  
Independent Variables: Control Variables 
My models include a set of commonly used variables from the empirical 
executive compensation literature to control for expected CEO compensation. One group 
of control variables captures characteristics of the environment in which the firm 
operates, while a second group of variables controls for certain CEO characteristics with 
a potential effect on compensation. All control variables representing dollar amounts are 
adjusted to 1996 dollars using the CPI index to control for inflation. 
Larger firms have more complex operations requiring more skilled executives, 
which may be paid more (Baker and Hall, 2004). Furthermore, the more complex 
environment of larger firms may make direct monitoring more difficult such that higher 
levels of equity incentives are needed to address agency problems (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). I control for firm size effects (SIZE) by including the natural logarithm of 
previous year's total assets in the regressions.4
Smith and Watts (1992) argue that firms with dynamic growth have more 
complex operations and may need more skilled managers with higher pay. Furthermore, 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) stress that performance signals in a dynamic 
 
4 As a test of robustness, I also use the natural logarithm of previous year's net sales and  of previous year's 
market value of equity as proxies for firm size. 
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growth environment are likely to be noisier. Their study suggests that monitoring in high-
growth firms is more difficult and implies that firms will resort to increased equity 
incentives to align shareholder and management interests (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). As 
in previous literature, I use the book-to-market ratio (B_to_M) as a proxy for growth 
opportunities and operation complexity (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Engel et al., 2002). The 
book-to-market ratio is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value 
of common equity measured at the end of the previous fiscal year. It is important to 
control for expected compensation using predetermined variables (Core, 2002). I follow 
Core (2002) and measure both SIZE and B_to_M at the end of the previous year as a 
predetermined control for expected compensation. 
Firm risk is an additional important control as firm risk bears both on the firm's 
information environment and the risk of its operating environment. No exclusive 
prediction exists as to the exact effect of firms' idiosyncratic risk on the compensation 
contract of executives (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985). I control for the effect of firm risk (VOLATILITY) on the 
compensation contract by including the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for 
the fiscal year obtained from the CRSP monthly stock files (Engel et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, the firm’s capital structure can affect the CEO’s pay-for-performance 
sensitivity in multiple ways. For instance increased debt may mitigate agency problems 
by inducing closer monitoring by creditors of the corporation and by reducing the 
available free cash flow (Ortiz-Molina, 2007). I control for firm’s capital structure 
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(LEVERAGE) by including the debt-to-asset ratio defined as total liabilities divided by 
total assets as of fiscal year end. 
Drawing on Palia (2001) and Himmelberg et al. (1999), I also include capital 
intensity (CAP), i.e., the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to net sales for the 
fiscal year as a control variable. Long-term tangible assets can be monitored more easily 
than more discretionary "soft capital" inputs (e.g., R&D spending or advertising 
spending). Accordingly, capital intensity serves as proxy for the extent of agency 
problems. A specific control for levels of managerial discretion through levels of soft-
capital spending is difficult to implement due to limited reporting of the necessary data 
items. Inclusion of the fixed-capital-to-sales ratio, however, also entails an inverse 
control for soft capital.  
Standard agency theory suggests that compensation is an increasing function of 
firm performance. Consistent with Sloan (1993), Core (2002), Core et al. (1999), as well 
as the majority of compensation research, I include market- and accounting based 
measures of firm performance in the models: stock returns (RETURN) and the change in 
return on assets (QROA). RETURN is the annual stock return of the firm for the fiscal 
year compounded from CRSP monthly stock files; QROA is the difference in earnings 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets from the year prior to the fiscal year to 
the fiscal year. Including QROA rather than ROA takes into account that ROA is 
persistent and uses lagged ROA as a proxy for expected ROA (Lambert and Larcker, 
1987). Core (2002) demonstrates that the results of regressions of levels of compensation 
on ROA are sensitive to the exclusion of a control for expected ROA. The use of QROA 
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accomplishes this control. RETURN and QROA are also the dominant performance 
measures used in the literature to assess pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
In addition to the above controls for firms’ economic parameters, I control for the 
presence of a dual class of shares, incorporation in Delaware, and the adoption of a “zero 
cash” compensation policy. Some firms have more than one class of stock and unequal 
voting rights among the various classes of shares exist. In the typical dual-class company, 
there is a publicly traded “inferior” class of stock with one vote per share and a non-
publicly traded “superior” class of stock with ten votes per share usually owned mostly 
by the insiders (managers, directors, or founders) of the firm. Field and Karpoff (2002) 
report that 6% of firms in their sample of 1,042 firms going public between 1988 and 
1992 had a structure of unequal voting rights due to the existence of multiple classes of 
stock.  
Firms with more than one class of stock are virtually immune to a hostile takeover 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2007). Therefore, if a dual-class voting structure exists in a 
firm, there may be no need for insiders of such firms to add any additional entrenching 
provisions to the corporate charter or to give the anti-takeover laws of the state of 
incorporation particular consideration. I control for the extreme entrenching effect of 
unequal voting rights by including an indicator variable (DUAL_CLASS), which is equal 
to one if the corporation has at least one class of shares with superior voting rights, and 
zero otherwise. Furthermore, I control for incorporation in the state of Delaware by 
including an indicator variable (DELAWARE), which is equal to one if the firm is 
incorporated in Delaware, and zero otherwise. Incorporation in Delaware may be driven 
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by other factors than just the state’s levels of takeover protection. Delaware by far attracts 
the most out-of-state incorporations (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003). Delaware features a 
very well developed system of corporate law. Accordingly, incorporation in Delaware 
minimizes the risk associated with legal uncertainty associated with incorporation in 
other states that do not have as well-defined legal systems. Including an indicator variable 
for Delaware incorporation, thus, controls for a Delaware effect in the choice of the state 
of incorporation other than takeover protection.  
Finally, some firms may have adopted a “zero cash” compensation policy 
according to which no cash salary is paid to the executive. It is important to control for 
the presence of such compensation policies due to the large effect exercised by these 
"zero" observations in the regressions of cash compensation. I include an indicator 
variable (ZERO_CASH), which is equal to one if the firm has adopted an explicit policy 
not to pay cash compensation, and zero otherwise.  
Turning to the group of control variables reflecting CEO characteristics, I include 
CEO age (AGE) and the CEO’s length of tenure with the firm (TENURE) based on 
Gibbons and Murphy's (1992) study of executive career concerns. Their study suggests 
that younger executives work harder, and thus need fewer incentives, due to their long-
term career concerns. With increasing tenure, the executive's ability becomes known, 
career concerns become less important, and motivation requires larger incentives. 
Yermack (1997) suggests that agency problems are larger when the CEO is also the 
chairperson of the board. I, thus, include an indicator variable CHAIR, which is equal to 
one in the case of CEO-chairperson identity and zero otherwise. A particularly important 
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control, especially considering my particular sample of IPO firms, is CEO founder status. 
I include an indicator variable FOUNDER, which is equal to one if the CEO is the 
founder or one of the co-founders of the company, and zero otherwise. Conyon and He 
(2004) find that founder-CEOs receive lower total compensation and higher equity 
incentives, which is consistent with the importance of other private benefits of control for 
founder-CEOs not captured in compensation. 
Furthermore, I control for the CEO’s ownership stake in the firm (OWN), which 
is defined as the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO and his or her 
immediate family. Core et al. (1999) find that CEO ownership has a significant negative 
association with levels of compensation. This negative relationship is consistent with the 
expectation that annual compensation plays a less important role for executives who 
derive a substantial part of their wealth from their shareholdings in the firm. Controlling 
for CEO ownership is particularly important in my sample of IPO firms. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) show that firms’ display a value-maximizing ownership structure consistent 
with, among other aspects, the optimization of monitoring effectiveness. However, this 
may not hold for firms immediately after their IPO. Aggarwal and Samwick (2002) note 
that CEOs of recent IPOs, particularly founder-CEOs, own large fractions of the 
company, but that this fractional ownership is not due to optimal contracting in a 
principal-agent setting. Similarly, Field and Hanka (2001) show that executives’ 
ownership positions remain very high one year after the IPO, falling from 27.5% at the 
time of the IPO to 25.3% one year later, in part due to lockup provisions. Since higher 
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retained CEO ownership indicates a decreased need for the grant of equity-based pay to 
align shareholder and management interests, controlling for CEO ownership is crucial. 
I incorporate an indicator variable for a change of the CEO in the fiscal year 
(NEW_CEO), which is equal to one if the CEO has changed from the year prior to the 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise. If a new CEO takes office, large equity incentives may be 
required to immediately align shareholder-management interests (Engel et al., 2002). 
This variable, thus, controls for unusual patterns in compensation due to a change in the 
office holder. Data for all variables capturing CEO characteristics (AGE, TENURE, 
CHAIR, FOUNDER, OWN, and NEW_CEO) come from ExecuComp and have been 
supplemented with information from firms' registration filings and annual proxy 
statements. Finally, I control for year effects by including calendar year indicator 
variables (YEAR) and for industry effects by including indicator variables for the 48 
Fama-French industries (INDUSTRY) (Fama and French, 1997). Table 26 summarizes 
the Fama-French industry classifications.  
 
[Insert Table 26 about here] 
 
Empirical Methodology 
My data are characterized by repeated observations for a sample of firms over 
time, and, thus, represent a panel. I therefore expect the observations for each firm to be 
serially and cross-sectionally correlated. The structure of my data dictates that the 
common assumption of OLS regression (errors are both homoskedastic and uncorrelated 
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across observations) may be predictably violated. Firstly, I expect the presence of firm 
effect in my data, i.e., I expect the 1999 residual for firm A to be correlated with the 2000 
residual for firm A. This effect may be temporary only. Specifically, the 1999 residual for 
firm A may be more highly correlated to the 2000 residual for firm A than to the 2005 
residual. In addition, the possibility of a time effect exists in my data. This means the 
year 1 post-IPO residual of firm A may be correlated to the year 1 post-IPO residual of 
firm B. However, my sample contains firms that went public during the period 1996 to 
2002. Therefore, the year 1 after IPO is not the same calendar year for all firms. This 
considerably mitigates the concern that a macroeconomic shock, e.g., a September 11 
effect, influences variables, such as net income, sales, stock returns etc, across all firms 
and, thus, causes observations to be correlated across time. My concern, therefore, lies 
primarily with an estimation approach that reliably corrects for the firm effect. 
Petersen (2007) and Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor (2008) review frequently used 
estimation techniques for correcting cross-sectional and time series dependence in 
finance and accounting panel data sets. Both studies find that the performance of the 
approaches varies considerably and depends on the structure of the data. Comparing the 
standard methodologies employed in the literature, Petersen (2007) finds that in the 
presence of a firm effect, standard errors are biased when estimated by OLS, White, 
Newey-West, Fama-MacBeth, or Fama-MacBeth corrected for first-order autocorrelation. 
In addition, one frequently used econometric method used for the analysis of panel data, a 
firm-fixed effects model (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000; Himmelberg et al., 
1999), produces unbiased standard errors only when the firm effect is permanent rather 
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than temporary. A firm fixed effects approach would be problematic if used for my study 
for other reasons, as well. The fixed-effects approach eliminates the unobservable time-
invariant firm-fixed effects by differencing sample observations around the time-series 
sample means. Since my variable of interest, entrenchment at IPO, is time-invariant, 
differencing the observations would eliminate the variable. A firm fixed-effects model is, 
therefore, not a feasible approach for my research question. 
To address the econometric issues presented by the structure of my data set, I use 
a two-way fixed effects regression model with both year and industry dummy variables. 
To control for time-series dependence, i.e., the fact that firm-level observations are 
expected to be correlated over time that is the “firm” effect, I avoid the aforementioned 
approaches and use cluster robust standard errors, clustering on a firm-level as suggested 
by Petersen (2007) and Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2008). Cluster-robust standard 
errors, also referred to as Huber-White or Rogers standard errors, represent an extension 
of the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The Huber-White estimator 
consistently estimates standard errors if errors are uncorrelated across clusters, but allows 
for correlation within cluster. Thus, clustering by firm will reliably correct for time-series 
correlation, which is a primary concern given the structure of my data, but assumes that 
observations across clusters are independent. Based on simulated data, Petersen (2007) 
shows that standard errors clustered by firm are unbiased and produce correctly sized 
confidence intervals whether the firm effect is permanent or temporary. 
To address remaining concerns of a time-effect in addition to a firm-effect in my 
data, I include calendar year dummies in the regressions to control for time-effects 
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parametrically. However, as indicated above, cross-sectional correlation, i.e., time 
effects, should be mitigated in my data set due to the selection of firms from different 
IPO years, such that no consistent year-effect should be observable across firms.  
Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Compensation (H1a-c) 
I will estimate the following model (1) to assess the effect of entrenchment at IPO 
on CEO compensation: 
ln(CEO COMPENSATION)it = X0it + X1 ENTi + X2 SIZEit-1 + X3 B_to_Mit-1 + 
X4 LEVERAGEit + X5 CAPit + X6 VOLATILITYit + X7 RETURNit + X8
QROAit + X9 DUAL_CLASSit + X10 DELAWAREit + X11 ZERO_CASH + X12 
FOUNDERit + X13 CHAIRit + X14 NEW_CEOit + X15 TENUREit + X16 AGEit 
+ X17 OWNit + ZXk YEAR + ZXl INDUSTRY + [it (1) 
In the above model (1), the subscript i refers to a firm and the subscript t refers to 
a year such that each it represents a firm-year observation for a variable. The dependent 
variable ln(CEO COMPENSATION) represents the natural log of one of three 
specifications of CEO compensation: cash compensation (CASHCOMP),5 stock-based 
compensation (STOCKCOMP), or total compensation (TCOMP). The variable ENT 
represents entrenchment at IPO and, thus, is time-invariant. The variables SIZE and 
B_to_M are for the fiscal year prior to the fiscal year of the compensation grant, i.e., t-1.
All other variables are measured for the fiscal year t of the compensation grant. The firm-
 
5 My primary operationalization of CEO cash compensation is based on the sum of CEOs' annual salary 
and bonus (CASHCOMPb), (Core, Guay, and Verrecchia, 2003; Sloan, 1993). As a test of robustness, I 
also estimate the model for CASHCOMP using two alternative specifications: CASHCOMPa is annual 
salary only and CASHCOMPc is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash compensation. 
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year error term is denoted as [it. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix C. 
Statistical significance tests on X1 will inform on the effect of entrenchment at IPO on 
subsequent CEO compensation. 
Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Compensation over Time (H2a-c) 
I will test the long-term effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation by 
adding interaction terms of the entrenchment measure ENT with a time trend variable 
TIME (model 2a) and with a set of indicator variables for the years post-IPO (model 2b) 
to the model for testing H1a-c (model 1 above): 
ln(CEO COMPENSATION)it = X0it + X1 ENTi + X2 SIZEit-1 + X3 B_to_Mit-1 + 
X4 LEVERAGEit + X5 CAPit + X6 VOLATILITYit + X7 RETURNit + X8
QROAit + X9 DUAL_CLASSit + X10 DELAWAREit + X11 ZERO_CASH + X12 
FOUNDERit + X13 CHAIRit + X14 NEW_CEOit + X15 TENUREit + X16 AGEit 
+ X17 OWNit + X18 ENTixTIMEit + ZXk YEAR + ZXl INDUSTRY + [it (2a) 
In the above model, ln(CEO COMPENSATION) again represents the natural log 
of one of three specifications of CEO compensation: cash compensation (CASHCOMP), 
stock-based compensation (STOCKCOMP), or total compensation (TCOMP). All other 
variables are the same as those in the model (1), except for the inclusion of an interaction 
term of ENT with a variable TIME, which equals 1 in the first year post-IPO, 2 in the 
second year post-IPO etc. If the effect of ENT changes over the years, it should result in a 
positive (or negative) and significant result for X18.
Alternatively, I test for a time trend in the effect of entrenchment on levels of 
CEO compensation by adding four interaction terms to model (1) which capture the 
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differential effects, if any, of ENT in the years 2, 3, 4, and 5 post-IPO, respectively. For 
each firm-year observation, the dummy variables YEAR2 to YEAR5 indicate whether the 
observation relates to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 5th year post-IPO, respectively. These 
variables are coded one if the observation is for that particular year, and zero otherwise: 
ln(CEO COMPENSATION)it = X0it + X1 ENTi + X2 SIZEit-1 + X3 B_to_Mit-1 + 
X4 LEVERAGEit + X5 CAPit + X6 VOLATILITYit + X7 RETURNit + X8
QROAit + X9 DUAL_CLASSit + X10 DELAWAREit + X11 ZERO_CASH + X12 
FOUNDERit + X13 CHAIRit + X14 NEW_CEOit + X15 TENUREit + X16 AGEit 
+ X17 OWNit + X18 ENTi x YEAR2it + X19 ENTi x YEAR3it + X20 ENTi x
YEAR4it + X21 ENTi x YEAR5it + ZXk YEAR + ZXl INDUSTRY + [it (2b) 
In this specification, the variable ENT only captures the effect of entrenchment in 
the first year after IPO. If the result of entrenchment at IPO is a constant shift in 
bargaining power, as suggested by the managerial-power theory, then the time passed 
since the IPO should not mitigate the effect of entrenchment on the levels of 
compensation. Hence, the coefficients on X18 to X21 should be non-significant, or, in the 
case of extreme power, positive and significant. In contrast, the optimal contracting view 
posits that contracting arrangements serve as substitutes. In the presence of entrenchment 
at IPO firms will react to the out-of-equilibrium situation by adjusting alternative 
governance components such as board effectiveness or ownership structure so that CEO 
compensation is set at optimal levels. Accordingly, from the optimal contracting 
perspective, any effect of entrenchment at IPO should be mitigated over time, suggesting 
that the coefficients on X18 to X21 display a negative trend. 
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Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity (H3a-b) 
Following the majority of studies, which center on the "flow" of executive 
compensation, I employ the following model (3) for testing the effect of entrenchment at 
IPO on pay-for-performance sensitivity: 
Qln(CEO COMPENSATION)it = X0it + X1 RETURNit + X2 ENTi x RETURNit 
+ X3 QROAit + X4 ENTi x QROAit + ZXk YEAR + ZXl INDUSTRY + [it (3) 
In the above model, lnQ(CEO COMPENSATION), i.e., ln(CEO 
COMPENSATION)t – ln(CEO COMPENSATION)t-1, represents the change in log cash 
compensation (QlnCASHCOMP) or total compensation (QlnTCOMP), respectively. In a 
basic model of pay-for-performance sensitivity, the estimated coefficients X1 and X3
indicate the sensitivities of CEO cash or total compensation with respect to the creation 
of shareholder value, either measured as stock or accounting performance. Pay-for-
performance sensitivity represents the CEO's share of value creation and gives a direct 
indication of the severity of agency problems (Murphy, 1999). My test of hypotheses 3a 
and 3b is modeled after Kren and Kerr (1997) and Davila and Penalva (2006). I use the 
coefficients on the interaction terms X2 and X4 to draw inferences about the effect of 
entrenchment at IPO on pay-for-performance sensitivity. If one or both of the coefficients 
are positive and significant, then this result would suggest increased use of performance-
based compensation in the presence of entrenchment at IPO and provide evidence 
consistent with the optimal contracting theory. However, if the coefficients were not 
significant, or negative and significant, then the effect of entrenchment at IPO on 
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executive pay-for-performance sensitivity would be consistent with the managerial-power 
perspective. 
While I focus on changes in the annual grants of executive compensation to assess 
pay-for-performance sensitivity, a significant number of studies focuses alternatively on 
comprehensive changes in executive wealth, which includes wealth effects from CEO 
stock holdings and prior period stock-related compensation grants (e.g., Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Core and Guay, 1999). However, using a compensation measure which 
includes wealth effects from the "stock" of equity owned by the CEO assumes that the 
board of directors has full discretion in setting CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. In 
particular, it assumes that CEO ownership is a choice variable controlled by the board 
(Ortiz-Molina, 2007). It can be argued, however, that CEO stock ownership, vested stock, 
and stock option holdings, may reflect the CEO's personal portfolio choices rather than 
incentive alignment decisions by the board (Ofek and Yermack, 2000). In my setting of 
IPO firms, it is particularly unlikely that CEO equity holdings are a consequence of board 
compensation choices. CEO equity holdings may be an artifact of the ownership structure 
prior to taking the firm public, particularly for founder-CEOs. Focusing on the flow 
compensation, i.e., the board's annual compensation grant decision, is, therefore, more 
appropriate in the context of this study. 
Extended Analysis: Components of Entrenchment 
While I believe that all eleven items included in my analysis contribute to 
entrenchment (ENT), I also believe that entrenchment is based on the two latent 
constructs of internal and external entrenchment. In my framework, internal 
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entrenchment stems from constitutional provisions that restrict the voting rights of 
shareholders and, thereby, hamper the ability of a majority of shareholders to impose its 
will on management. External entrenchment, in contrast, is the result of anti-takeover 
measures adopted at the firm level and of takeover protection provided under state law 
both affecting the effectiveness of market control over management.  
The hypotheses concerning the effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO 
compensation so far have been based on a measure of total entrenchment at IPO 
combining provisions detrimental to both internal and external control over management. 
Using multiple indicators for the variable of interest “entrenchment,” as proposed in this 
study, is more reliable than using a single item measure and can alleviate measurement 
error. Similarly, pertinent studies on shareholder rights or takeover defenses have all 
employed composite measures of various charter provisions and legal takeover 
protection. Field and Karpoff (2002) consider ten (not counting subgroups) and Daines 
and Klausner (2001) consider eleven takeover defenses. Gompers et al. (2003) construct 
an index of 24 different governance provisions. Bebchuk et al. (2005) combine six 
measures into their entrenchment index. However, with respect to the use of multiple-
item measures of corporate governance, Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) show that 
the prolificacy of inconsistent results between corporate governance and accounting and 
economic outcomes can be attributed to the generally modest levels of reliability and lack 
of construct validity of such composite measures of governance.  
As part of an extended analysis I will, therefore, validate my entrenchment 
measure by conducting an exploratory factor analysis to ensure that the items combined 
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in my measure capture the same underlying governance construct (Larcker et al., 2007). 
Yet from the outset, two separate categories of entrenching provisions can be identified: 
entrenchment due to restrictions on shareholder voting power and entrenchment due to 
restrictions on the market for corporate control. A priori, I expect four of the firm-level 
provisions relating to shareholder voting rights to be reflective of internal entrenchment. 
The two remaining firm-level provisions and the five state laws arguably contribute 
primarily to external entrenchment. If the results of the factor analysis suggest that my 
composite measure of total entrenchment indeed captures distinct aspects of 
entrenchment, I will assess the separate effects of these components by repeating key 
analyses replacing ENT with its components in the models.  
In general, I do not expect the direction of the effect of components of 
entrenchment, i.e., external and/or internal entrenchment, to be different from the effect 
of total entrenchment at IPO. I hypothesize, however, that both external and internal 
entrenchment has a unique and discernible effect on CEO compensation. Thus, I expect 
external and internal entrenchment to be complements rather than substitutes. Insiders 
determined to entrench themselves in their desire to maintain private benefits of control 





Empirical Results and Analysis 
Sample Selection and Description 
The construction of my sample begins with the identification of IPO firms 
completing an initial public offering for common stock in the US market during the 
period from 1996 to 2002 from Thomson Financials' SDC Global New Issues database (n 
= 3,184). I eliminate foreign firms (n = 324) and firms operating in regulated industries, 
i.e., firms in the banking and insurance industry (n = 469) based on firms’ primary SIC 
code in the 6000s. These selection criteria yield a set of 2,355 firms. A significant 
number of these firms lack matching data on Compustat (n = 774). These are probably 
small issuers with fewer than 500 investors and less than $10 million in total assets who 
are not required to file reports with the SEC.  
The largest demand on the data stems from limited coverage of firms in 
ExecuComp. ExecuComp contains compensation and related data primarily for firms 
included in the S&P 1500 index. Some firms are covered continuously from the year of 
their IPO. However, the majority of firms appear in ExecuComp only some years after 
the IPO making it necessary to backfill missing information with hand-collected data 
from the firm's proxy statements (SEC form DEF14A). In total, ExecuComp provides full 
or partial annual compensation data for 224 of the firms identified in SDC as having gone 
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public between 1996 and 2002. Two of these firms lack matching data in CRSP. Finally, 
of the remaining 222 firms originally identified, 21 firms had to be eliminated due to 
various problems in the data. Several firms were misidentified in Thompson SDC as 
IPOs, but in fact were seasoned equity offerings. For some firms, which went public in 
early 1996, the IPO prospectus and registration statement were not available on EDGAR. 
To offset the shrinkage in sample size, I collected additional data for a set of 21 firms 
going public in 1997. My final sample, thus, still comprises 222 firms. The majority of 
these firms, 201, appear in the ExecuComp database within 5 years after their IPO, 21 
additional firms are not covered in ExecuComp. In all of the regressions, inclusion or 
exclusion of these latter firms has no appreciable effect on the results. The sample 
selection process is summarized in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Some concern may exist whether relying on ExecuComp data to construct a 
sample of IPO firms introduces sample selection bias in the study. ExecuComp primarily 
covers firms included in the S&P 1500 index and, thus, the coverage is biased towards 
larger firms. Inclusion in the S&P 1500 within five years after IPO is not a typical 
outcome for the average IPO. Primarily drawing on a sample of IPO firms covered in 
ExecuComp raises the concern that such sample of IPO firms may not reflect the typical 
IPO in terms of its average size. The inclusion of twenty firms in the final sample that are 
not covered in ExecuComp partially addresses this concern. 
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To provide additional evidence that my sample of IPO firms is not materially 
different from average, i.e., smaller, IPOs with respect to entrenchment levels, I conduct 
a t-test comparing the entrenchment score of the smallest and largest ten percent of firms 
in my sample.6 On average, firms in the lowest decile of total assets displayed a lower 
level of entrenchment at IPO (M = 3.28, SE = .205) than firms in the highest decile of 
total assts (M = 3.32, SE = .202). This difference is not significant (t = -0.150, p = .881). 
Arguably, in terms of size, the smallest IPO firms included in my sample are most similar 
to the IPO firms not included in my sample. Evidence, thus, exists that no material 
difference in levels of entrenchment is present between firms included in my sample and 
on average smaller IPO firms not included. This result is consistent with Bebchuk et al. 
(2005) who report no significant difference in their entrenchment index between S&P 
500 and non-S&P 500 firms. 
For each of the 222 firms, entrenchment information and up to five years of 
compensation data have been compiled. For various reasons, e.g., bankruptcies, mergers, 
going private etc., some firms disappear from the sample within five years post-IPO. The 
final data set, therefore, has 999 firm-year observations. The actual number of 
observations used in each of the regressions differs slightly due to elimination of outliers 
and missing information for individual variables.  
 




Descriptive statistics on the entrenchment items provide insights about the 
average entrenchment posture taken by IPO firms during the time frame from 1996 to 
2002. The mean entrenchment score for the firms in my sample is 3.64 (SD 2.147), 
ranging from 0 to 11 with a median of 4. Thirty-five percent of firms’ CEOs are covered 
under Golden Parachute agreements, and 12% of firms have adopted a Poison Pill when 
going public. Staggered Boards are common as 64% of firms provide for a board of 
directors divided in several classes serving staggered terms. Many firms have adopted 
some supermajority requirements for changes to the corporate charter (56% of firms) or 
bylaws (55% of firms). Supermajority requirements for merger approvals are less 
frequent and have been adopted by 11% of IPO firms.  
A significant majority of firms are covered under some form of statute restricting 
business combinations (92%). This high percentage is due to the fact that a substantial 
number of firms in my sample (74%) are incorporated in Delaware, which has passed a 
Business Combination Statute as its only significant piece of anti-takeover legislation. A 
considerable number of firms elected not to be governed under these laws, though, such 
that the actual percentage of firms governed under a Business Combination Statute is 
82%. Business Combination Statutes provide for similar restrictions on majority rights in 
the case of a merger as could be accomplished by supermajority requirements contained 
in firms’ corporate charters. Thus, the relatively low percentage of firms that have 
adopted merger restrictions in their corporate charter can be explained by widespread 
coverage of firms under Business Combination Statutes. The supplemental nature of 
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these two takeover restrictions accentuates that firm-level legal choices and state-level 
legislation are interwoven and must be considered jointly to achieve a complete picture of 
firms’ anti-takeover protection. 
Firms’ coverage under the remaining State laws considered in this study, Control 
Share Acquisition, Fair Price, Poison Pill Endorsement, and Constituencies Statutes, is 
6%, 14%, 15%, and 13% respectively. These percentages take firms' choices not to be 
covered under these statutes into account. For instance, 14% of sample firms are 
incorporated in states that adopted a Control Share Acquisition Statute, but a majority of 
firms elected not to be covered. Therefore, actual coverage of firms under such statute in 
the sample is only 6%. Firms' widespread use of options to tailor State anti-takeover 
protection according to their needs and preferences lends further credence to a 
comprehensive measure that combines firm-level and state-level measures with a bearing 
on insider entrenchment. Detailed descriptive information on the entrenchment items is 
shown in Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Descriptive statistics on the compensation, firm, and CEO variables are presented 
in Table 4. This information is presented for the raw data, before adjusting to 1996 
constant dollars or applying log transformations. Providing the descriptive table for the 
raw variables enables easier screening for data reasonableness and comparison to 
universally reported metrics.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Large differences between reported medians and means, particularly for the 
compensation variables and SIZE (total assets), indicate the presence of substantial 
skewness. The log transformation was applied to all strongly skewed variables to achieve 
an approximately normal distribution. The largest annual compensation package received 
by an individual CEO, Thomas M. Siebel of Siebel Systems Inc. in fiscal year 2001, was 
in excess of $317 million. I verified by double-checking the source documents, proxy 
statements etc., that these and other extreme observations in fact are legitimate. I opted 
against winsorizing the data set. While these and other observations in the tails of their 
respective distributions are extreme in magnitude, they are nevertheless genuine and 
contribute important information. However, to address the concern of undue influence of 
extreme observations on the regression equations, I conduct model-specific influence 
diagnostics on all observations and eliminate high influence points. All regression results 
reported in this study are, thus, based on samples cleared of any observations displaying 
values of the studentized residual larger than |2| and leverage (hat diagonals) larger than a 
cut-off point of twice the average leverage value defined as the number of parameters in 
the regression divided by the number of observations (Hoaglin and Welsch, 1978).  
A potential problem in any multivariate regressions analysis is the presence of 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity exists when one or more of the predictors are linear 
combinations of one another as evidenced by a strong correlation. In the presence of 
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multicollinearity, coefficient estimates are unstable and may change unpredictably in 
response to minor changes in the model specifications. An initial assessment concerning 
potential multicollinearity can be based on the presence of significant correlation between 
any pair of the predictor variables. The Pearson correlations for all primary dependent 
and independent variables are displayed in Table 5. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
None of the predictor variables displays a very high correlation with another 
predictor variable except the interaction terms of ENTxRETURN with RETURN, r =
.860, p (two-tailed) < .01, and ENTxQROA with QROA, r = .910, p (two-tailed) < .01. 
Accordingly, there is reason for initial concern that multicollinearity may affect the 
regression results in the pay-for-performance models, which contain both of these 
variables. For all models, results of specific multicollinearity diagnostics based on 
Variance Inflation Factors and Condition Indices are discussed in the context of the 
presentation of results for each model. Summarizing the results briefly, in none of the 
models did multicollinearity appear to pose an appreciable problem based on these more 
sophisticated diagnostic tools. 
The correlation matrix, furthermore, shows a positive and significant correlation 
of entrenchment at IPO, ENT, with levels of cash compensation regardless of 
specification (CASHCOMPa, b, and c) in all cases (two-tailed test, p < 0.01). Also, some 
significant correlations exist between the interaction terms of ENT with RETURN as well 
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as QROA and some of the changes-in-compensation specifications. These correlations 
provide initial evidence that a significant association exists between entrenchment at IPO 
and CEO compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Compensation (H1a-c) 
I employ model (1) to ascertain the effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO cash, 
stock-based, and total compensation, respectively, and to test hypotheses H1a through 
H1c. For all of the specifications of model (1), I first conduct comprehensive 
multicollinearity diagnostics. Collinearity exists when there is a strong correlation among 
two or more predictor variables in the regression model. Since multicollinearity, thus, is a 
function of the predictor variables only, the results of the collinearity diagnostics are 
irrespective of the specific component of executive compensation included as the 
dependent variable in model (1). Results, thus, can be presented here jointly for all 
models specifications discussed next.  
Myers (1990) proposes that Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) larger than 10 give 
reason to suspect multicollinearity. In model (1), the variable SIZE displays the largest 
VIF with a value of 2.361,7 which is considerably below the suggested threshold value. 
The VIF of no other variable exceeds 2. Similarly, values of the tolerance statistics, 
defined as the reciprocal of the VIFs, are all well above the .2 cut-off points for potential 
 
7 Reported values of the multicollinearity diagnostics are based on model (1) with lnTCOMP as the 
dependent variable. Multicollinearity diagnostics for all of the regressions of levels of CEO compensation 
on ENT produce very similar results. Any slight differences in the results of the collinearity diagnostics in 
the models for lnCASHCOMPa, lnCASHCOMPb, lnCASHCOMPc, lnSTOCKCOMP, and lnTCOMP are 
due entirely to slight differences in the sample composition. Results of the collinearity diagnostics are not 
included in tabulated form. 
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problems suggested by Menard (1995). Finally, the largest condition index (CI) is 39.88. 
The next highest CI value is 21.87. No other but the single largest CI exceeds the 
threshold value of 30. Investigation of the variance proportions for this CI value indicates 
a possible dependency between the variables SIZE, AGE, and the intercept. Exclusion of 
the variable AGE from the analysis reduces the magnitude of the largest CI to a value 
below the threshold of 30 (CI = 28.51). However, there is no evidence that the exclusion 
of the variable AGE improves the model and removes instability in the coefficient 
estimates. The results of the regression analyses, i.e., the direction of the signs on the 
coefficients, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates etc., are not affected by the 
exclusion or inclusion of AGE in the analysis. In sum, I conclude that multicollinearity 
does not pose an appreciable problem in the models estimating the effect of entrenchment 
on levels of CEO compensation. I, thus, also opt not to exclude AGE from the analysis.  
Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Cash Compensation (H1a) 
Hypothesis H1, formulated in accordance with the managerial power theory of 
executive compensation contracts, predicts a positive association of entrenchment at IPO 
with levels of annual CEO cash compensation. The expected relation, however, would be 
negative under the optimal contracting view. My primary operationalization of CEO cash 
compensation is based on the log of CEO annual salary plus bonus (lnCASHCOMPb). 
Table 6 displays coefficient estimates and results of significance tests for model (1) with 
lnCASHCOMPb being the dependent variable. Column A displays results of a regression 
of lnCASHCOMPb on ENT and industry and calendar year control variables only. 
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Column B introduces firm economic variables and Column C adds CEO characteristics. 
Finally, Column D presents results for the full model including all control variables. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
All models are significant as indicated by F-test results that are significant at p <
.0001. Adjusted-R2 for the four models included in Table 6 varies between .129 and .671, 
depending on the number and nature of control variables included. The statistical results 
provide strong evidence for a positive effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO's annual 
cash compensation measured as the sum of salary and bonus. The coefficient on ENT is 
positive and significant across all model specifications (Columns) at the 5% respectively 
1% confidence levels indicating that CEO of firms that adopted entrenching provisions 
when going public receive higher levels of salary and bonus in the years post-IPO. 
Inclusion or exclusion of the firm and CEO controls does not materially affect the result 
as shown in Columns B and C. The significance of ENT (t = 3.43, p = .0007) is strongest 
in the full model, controlling for determinants of compensation rooted in both firm and 
CEO characteristics. Firm size, stock returns, incorporation in Delaware and the length of 
the CEO's tenure with the firm exercise a discernible positive effect on cash 
compensation. Conversely, firms' capital intensity and stock volatility, CEO's founder 
status, newly hired CEO's, and CEO's percentage ownership decrease levels of cash 
compensation. Furthermore, the indicator variable for firms that explicitly disclose a 
policy not to pay cash compensation to their CEO has the expected strong negative effect 
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on CEO cash compensation. In this manner, the variable controls for the effect of 
observations with a zero value for the dependent variable (Engel et al., 2002). Zero cash 
policies are not common. Excluding the 12 firm-year observations for the firms that have 
adopted such a policy rather than controlling for the effect parametrically significantly 
reduces the adjusted-R2 for the full model (Table 6, Column D) from .671 to .480. 
However, exclusion does not affect the significance tests for the remaining variables. 
While controlling for zero cash policies is important in regressions of CEO cash 
compensation, the indicator variable ZERO_CASH is not statistically significant in the 
models of CEO total compensation presented later.  
As a test of robustness, I also assess the effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO 
cash compensation using two alternative measures of cash compensation: the log of the 
sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash compensation (lnCASHCOMPc) and the log 
of salary only (lnCASHCOMPa). Regression results for these models are presented in 
Tables 7 and 8. 
 
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
 
Results for lnCASHCOMPc reported in Table 6 are virtually identical to the 
results for lnCASHCOMPb. In models of CEO salary only, ENT (t = 1.62, p = .1073) 
does not exercise a significant effect if only the control variables for CEO characteristics 
are included (Table 7, Column C). However, controlling for both firm and CEO 
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characteristics, ENT (t = 2.18, p = .0306) displays a positive and significant association 
with CEOs annual salary (Table 7, Column D).  
Taken together, I find a positive and statistically significant association between 
entrenchment at IPO and CEO annual cash compensation. This result is irrespective of 
three alternative specification of CEO cash compensation. The positive association of 
entrenchment at IPO and CEO cash compensation confirms Hypothesis 1a.  
Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Stock-based Compensation (H1b) 
Hypothesis H1b, formulated in accordance with the optimal contracting theory of 
executive compensation contracts, predicts a positive association of entrenchment at IPO 
with levels of stock-based compensation. Under the managerial power perspective, there 
is no simple prediction as to the effect of entrenchment at IPO on levels of stock-based 
compensation. However, given the positive association of ENT with levels of cash 
compensation, a positive effect on stock-based compensation could be consistent with 
extreme managerial power. 
Table 9 presents the results for regressions of the log of CEO annual stock-based 
compensation on ENT and controls. Again, Column A shows results of a regression of 
lnSTOCKCOMP on ENT and industry and calendar year control variables only. Column 
B introduces firm economic variables and Column C adds CEO characteristics. Finally, 
Column D presents results for the full model including all control variables. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
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All models are significant as indicated by F-test results that are significant at p <
.001. Adjusted-R2 for the four models included in Table 9 varies between .078 and .236 
depending on the number and nature of control variables included. The sign on the 
coefficient of ENT is positive across all four models (Columns), indicating a positive 
direction of the effect of ENT of stock-based compensation. However, the effect of ENT 
is not statistically significant (t = 1.18, p = .240, Column D) in all models reported in 
Table 9. SIZE, RETURN, QROA, CHAIR and NEW_CEO are significantly and 
positively associated with levels of stock-based compensation, LEVERAGE, 
ZERO_CASH, and OWN reduce stock-based compensation.  
A positive effect of entrenchment on stock-based compensation was to be 
expected under the optimal contracting theory. The absence of a statistically discernible 
effect of entrenchment on increased stock-based compensation violates the substitution 
hypothesis on which the optimal contracting theory rests. However, not finding statistical 
significance is not a valid hypothesis test in support of the competing managerial power 
perspective. Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 9 appear to be more consistent 
with a managerial power explanation. Results of an extended analysis (Table 21) show 
that one component of entrenchment, firm-level external entrenchment, in fact is 
positively associated with stock-based compensation. These findings will be discussed 
below in context with other results of the extended analysis. At this stage, I conclude that 
the lack of association between ENT and CEO stock-based compensation does not 
confirm hypothesis H1b formulated under the optimal contracting perspective but might 
be consistent with a managerial power explanation. 
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Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Total Compensation (H1c) 
Hypothesis H1c, formulated in accordance with the managerial power theory, 
predicts a positive association of entrenchment at IPO with total CEO compensation. 
Again it is important to note that a positive association of ENT with total compensation 
would not contradict the optimal contracting perspective. Table 10 presents the results for 
regressions of CEO total compensation on ENT and controls.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
All models reported in Table 10 are significant as indicated by strongly significant 
F-statistics, p < .001. Adjusted-R2 varies between .077 and .378 depending on the number 
and nature of control variables included. The coefficient on ENT is positive across all 
model specifications. However, ENT is significant (t = 1.78, p (two-tailed) = .077) only 
in the full model including both firm and CEO controls (Column D). Controlling for firm 
economic and CEO characteristics, evidence thus exists that CEOs receive larger total 
compensation packages post-IPO when entrenching provisions have been adopted at IPO. 
The majority of firm and CEO control variables have a statically significant effect on 
total compensation. SIZE, RETURN, DELAWARE, CHAIR and NEW_CEO are 
significantly and positively associated with levels of total compensation, while B_TO_M, 
LEVERAGE, FOUNDER, and OWN show a negative association. Unexpectedly, the 
book to market ratio, which is a proxy for firms' growth opportunities, displays a negative 
coefficient, i.e., the sign is in the opposite direction as established by previous research. 
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However, in hindsight it is likely that the book to market ratio is not a good proxy for 
growth opportunities considering this particular set of firms. IPO firms by their very 
nature operate in a dynamic growth environment. As a consequence, "book-to-market" 
may stand in as a proxy for firm risk, profitability, or other factors affecting price. 
Furthermore, the control for firms' with zero cash policies does not exercise a significant 
effect on total compensation. In fact, the coefficient is positive albeit not significant at 
conventional levels (t = 1.35, p (two-tailed) = 0.195). Nevertheless, a weak indication 
exists that zero cash policies are costly and are paid for with higher total compensation. 
The positive and significant effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO total compensation 
confirms Hypothesis 1c, but by itself would also not be inconsistent with optimal 
contracting. All results will have to be interpreted jointly and in context to distinguish 
between the two possible explanations.  
Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Compensation over Time (H2a – H2c) 
I explore potential variations in the effects of entrenchment at IPO over time 
primarily with an eye on the substitution hypothesis, which follows from the optimal 
contracting theory. Under the optimal contracting perspective, the effect of entrenchment 
at IPO should not be permanent. Firms' will react to exogenously determined levels of 
entrenchment at IPO, adjust other governance mechanism and design the CEO's pay 
structure to set incentives at an optimal level. Unexpected compensation due to 
entrenchment at IPO, thus, should disappear over time. Results in Tables 6 to 10 show the 
mean effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO cash, stock-based, and total compensation 
based on the execution of model (1). Model (1), however, does not control for a potential 
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time effect in entrenchment, which may bias the results against finding patterns 
consistent with optimal contracting. Thus, the time-trend analysis below not only presents 
evidence concerning the persistence of the effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO 
compensations, but also serves as a robustness test for the evidence presented so far for 
hypotheses H1a through H1c. 
Tables 11 to 15 display results of the analyses of the effect of entrenchment at 
IPO on CEO compensation over time based on the execution of models 2a and 2b. For 
ease of comparison, I repeat Column D from the corresponding Tables 6 to 10 as Column 
A in Tables 11 to 15. Column B, then, shows the results for model 2a adding an 
interaction term of ENT with a continuous variable TIME, which equals 1 in the first year 
post-IPO, 2 in the second year post-IPO etc. Finally, Column C, tests for a time effect of 
ENT by executing model 2b, which adds four interaction terms of ENT with indicator 
variables YEAR2, YEAR3, YEAR4, YEAR5 that equal 1 if the observation is from year 
2, 3, 4, 5 post-IPO, and zero otherwise. In the latter specification, ENT captures the effect 
of ENT in the base year, year 1 post-IPO, only.  
The results of the examination of a time trend in the effect of entrenchment on 
CEO cash compensation are summarized in Tables 11 to 13. Again, three different 
specifications for CEO cash compensation have been used. 
 




The interaction term ENTxTIME is not significant in any of the regressions 
(Columns B of Tables 11 to 13) providing strong evidence that no consistent increasing 
or decreasing pattern in the effect of ENT exists. A constant effect of entrenchment at 
IPO – not affected by a time-trend – is consistent with the managerial power view, which 
argues that entrenchment causes a permanent shift in bargaining power.  
Considering differences in the effect of entrenchment in individual years, some 
results warrant additional explanation. In the regression of salary plus bonus 
(lnCASHCOMPb, Table 11, Column C), the interaction term ENTxYEAR2 is negative 
and significant (t = -2.11, p = .036). The other ENTxYEAR interactions are not 
significant, however. This result is unchanged when using lnCASHCOMPc (Table 12, 
Column C) instead of lnCASHCOMPb. By contrast, none of the ENTxYEAR 
interactions is significant in the regression of salary (lnCASHCOMPa, Table 13, Column 
C). The results for lnCASHCOMPb and lnCASHCOMPc, nevertheless, indicate a 
pronounced "dip" in the effect of entrenchment on CEO cash compensation in year 2 
post-IPO. The overall effect of entrenchment in year 2 post-IPO, however, is still 
positive. The base effect of ENT is positive (R = 0.068, t = 4.17, p < .0001; Table 11, 
Column C). Thus, the total effect of entrenchment in year 2 is 0.051 (0.068 -0.017).  
More importantly, the results for the ENTxYEAR interactions are hardly 
representative of a time trend. When comparing the magnitudes of the t-statistics for the 
ENTxYEAR interactions over time, these are -2.11, -1.05, -1.55 and -0.22 (Table 11, 
Column C), and, thus, show an overall decreasing trend. Decreasing t-statistics indicate 
that trend in the effect of ENT on cash compensation (if any) becomes less discernible 
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over time. Based on the latter consideration and the insignificant result for the 
ENTxTIME interaction presented in Column B, I conclude that the effect of 
entrenchment at IPO on CEO cash compensation is not subject to an increasing or 
decreasing time trend. 
Optimal contracting suggests a positive trend in the effect of entrenchment on 
stock-based compensation. Firms are expected to respond with increased use of 
performance-based compensation in the presence of entrenchment. Controlling for a time 
trend in the model for stock-based compensation, thus, also eliminates a potential 
alternative explanation for the results presented in Table 9. Specifically, the initial finding 
of no significant mean effect of ENT on stock-based compensation might have been due 
to potentially varying effects of ENT on stock-based compensation over time (as 
predicted by the optimal contracting theory) such that no mean effect is discernible 
absent a control for time effects. Table 14 presents results for this time trend analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
 
In Column B, the interaction term ENTxTIME is not significant (t = 0.78, p =
.436), suggesting that no time trend in the effect of entrenchment at IPO on stock-based 
compensation exists. In Column C, considering the effect of ENT across individual years, 
I find a discernibly different effect of ENT on levels of stock based compensation in year 
4 post-IPO (ENTxYEAR4, t = 2.00, p = .047). Again, the result may be singular. A time 
trend is not supported by the general observable pattern in the other interaction terms. 
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Specifically, while it is consistent with optimal contracting and the substitution 
hypothesis that higher levels of stock based compensation are paid in year 4 as compared 
to year 1 post-IPO, there is no explanation that stock-based compensation in year 5 again 
is not different from year 1 (ENTxYEAR5, t = 0.51, p = .607).  
Lastly, Table 15 displays the results of an examination of time trends in the effect 
of entrenchment on CEO total compensation. 
 
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
 
No time trend is discernible. The interaction term ENTxTIME is not significant, (t
= -0.68, p = .500); none of the interaction terms of ENTxYEAR is significant.  
In sum, controlling for potential time trends did not change the results of the 
analyses presented in Tables 6-10. Irrespective of the inclusion of time trend variables, 
ENT is positively and significantly associated with cash and total compensation, and no 
effect of ENT is discernible on stock-based compensation. The interaction term 
ENTxTIME is not significant in any of the models. Considering differential effects of 
ENT in individual years post-IPO, some interaction terms are significant. However, these 
results appear to be singular and not representative of a distinctive time trend. Taken 
together, the effect of entrenchment on CEO cash, stock-based, and total compensation 
appears not to change over time. These findings are consistent with Hypotheses H2a, 
H2b, and H2c formulated under the managerial power theory. At least for the first five 
years post-IPO, entrenchment exercises a constantly positive effect on CEO cash and 
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total compensation, suggesting that insiders' decision to adopt entrenching provisions at 
IPO results in long-term payouts for the CEO. 
Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity (H3a – 
H3b) 
Optimal contracting theory suggests increased used of performance-based 
compensation in the presence of otherwise weak governance mechanisms. This linkage 
can be directly assessed by an analysis of the effect of entrenchment on the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. In the models of pay-for-performance 
sensitivity, changes in cash or total compensation are regressed on annual stock returns 
and the annual change in ROA. The coefficients on RETURN and QROA give an 
indication of the "sharing rate," i.e., how much of the generated value will have to be paid 
out to the CEO. Under optimal contracting, the sharing rate should be larger as 
entrenchment increases because of increased use of performance-based compensation. 
Thus, empirically, optimal contracting suggests a positive and significant interaction of 
market or accounting based performance measures and ENT. 
Inclusion of RETURN and QROA together with their interaction terms with ENT 
in one model raises the concern of multicollinearity due to the high empirical correlation 
of RETURN and QROA with their interaction terms (see Table 5, Pearson Correlations). 
The VIFs for RETURN, ENTxRETURN, QROA, and ENTxQROA are 4.56, 4.26, 6.35, 
and 6.14 respectively.8 The two largest Condition Indices are 6.43 and 6.58 and, thus, not 
 




suggestive of multicollinearity. While the variance proportions confirm the expected 
dependency between RETURN and ENTxRETURN on the one hand, and QROA and 
ENTxQROA on the other hand, the small magnitude of the Condition Indices indicates 
that dependencies are not a serious concern. Results of the execution of model (3) are 
presented in Table 16. 
 
[Insert Table 16 about here] 
 
All models are significant as indicated by their F-statistics. R2 are low, in keeping 
with previous literature, and range from .038 to .090. The large number of control 
variables for calendar year and industry effects causes adjusted-R2 to turn negative for the 
salary (lnCASHCOMPa) model. Nevertheless, in keeping with all analyses presented in 
this study, year and industry control variables have also been included in model (3). I 
verified that all models assessing pay-for-performance sensitivity are significant if year 
and industry controls were excluded.  
In the models of lnCASHCOMPb (Column A) and lnCASHCOMPc (Column B), 
changes in CEO cash compensation are positively and significantly tied to market 
performance, i.e., stock returns (RETURN) and accounting performance (QROA). Salary 
(lnCASHCOMPa, Column C) is only tied to QROA. Changes in total compensation 
(Column D) are positively and significantly tied to RETURN only. These findings 
parallel the results by Sloan (1993) and Core (2002) who also find sensitivity of cash 
81 
 
compensation to stock returns and QROA, but sensitivity of total compensation to returns 
only. 
One result stands out. In Table 16, Column C, QlnCASHCOMPa shows a positive 
association with QROA as to be expected. However, ENTxQROA is negative and 
significant (t = -1.95, p = .052). This finding indicates that as ENT increases, the positive 
association between QROA and QlnCASHCOMPa decreases. Less of the changes in 
CEO salary can be explained with accounting performance as entrenchment at IPO 
increases. Earlier results presented in Table 8 show a positive and significant association 
of ENT with levels of CEO salary (lnCASHCOMPa). Entrenched CEOs receive higher 
salaries. However, the negative and significant interaction term ENTxQROA in Table 16, 
Column C, suggests that entrenchment may enable CEOs to disconnect their salaries 
from accounting performance. Hence, increased levels of CEO salary may be "pay-
without-performance." This result firmly contradicts optimal contracting. 
None of the other interaction terms of performance measures with ENT are 
significant in Table 16. However, I find remarkable changes, i.e., several significant 
interactions, after dissecting ENT into its underlying components, as discussed in the 
following section. The analyses of the effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity presented so far have produced no evidence in support of optimal 
contracting. Specifically, analyses did not discern an increase in the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of CEO cash and total compensation in response to entrenchment at IPO as to 
be expected under optimal contracting.  
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Managerial power does not per se predict an effect of entrenchment on pay-for-
performance. Nevertheless, a decrease in pay-for-performance sensitivity, as found for 
the explanatory power of QROA in QlnCASHCOMPa, supports an argument of extreme 
power. I, thus, interpret the evidence of being confirmatory of H3a and H3b formulated 
in accordance with the managerial power view.  
Extended Analysis: Components of Entrenchment 
Arguably two factors contribute to insiders' total entrenchment: internal 
entrenchment, reducing the efficacy of shareholder control over management, and 
external entrenchment, reducing the efficacy of market control over management by 
means of hostile takeovers. To unearth the underlying dimensions of entrenchment, I 
conduct a principal components analysis on the eleven items that make up my 
entrenchment measure. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 
1970) is .712 indicating that the sample size (n = 222) is sufficient. Bartlett's test of 
sphericity is significant, &2 (55) = 833.1, p < .0001, providing initial evidence that some 
relationship among the variables exists and that factor analysis is appropriate.  
I employ the Kaiser (1960) criterion, retaining all factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 1 and use an oblique rotation (direct oblimin). Use of an orthogonal rotation 
(varimax) does not affect the result. The resulting factor matrix (pattern matrix) is 
reproduced in Table 17. 
 




Three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 emerge, which capture 60.05% of 
the total variance in the entrenchment variables. The first factor combines the indicator 
variables for firms being covered under Constituencies, Fair Price, Poison Pill 
Endorsement, or Control Share Acquisition Statutes. This factor represents external 
entrenchment by means of state level anti-takeover protection. The second factor 
combines the variables for the percentage vote required to amend corporate charter or 
bylaws, staggered boards, and coverage under a business combination statutes. All of 
these variables represent restrictions shareholders influence by means of restricting 
shareholders' voting power. While the business combination variable is a state law, and 
not a firm-level item, it accomplishes restrictions by requiring an increased percentage of 
shareholder approval for mergers by law. Thus, its loading with other firm-level items 
that contain restriction on shareholder voting power is not unexpected. Taken together, 
the items comprising the second factor are representative of internal entrenchment due to 
restrictions on shareholder voting power. The third factor includes Golden Parachute 
agreements, the Poison Pill, and the percentage vote required for merger approvals 
contained in the corporate charter. All of these are firm level items, which are primarily 
directed towards restricting corporate takeovers.  
To derive a composite measure for each firm on a particular factor, I compute 
factor scores using the regression method. In the following, I present the results of key 
analyses previously presented but replacing the general measure of entrenchment, ENT, 
with the factor scores for its three components. The variable ENT_F1 represents state 
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level external entrenchment, ENT_F2 represents internal entrenchment, and ENT_F3 
represents firm-level external entrenchment.  
Analysis of the Effect of Components of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO 
Compensation 
In each of the Tables 18 to 22, Column A reproduces Column D from Tables 6 to 
10, i.e., the result for the models of levels of compensation including ENT and all control 
variables, for ease of comparisons. Column A in Tables 18, 19, and 20, thus, again shows 
the positive and significant association of ENT with CEO cash compensation defined as 
salary plus bonus (lnCASHCOMPb, Table 18), salary, bonus and other annual cash 
compensation (lnCASHCOMPc, Table 19), and salary alone (lnCASHCOMPa, Table 
20). 
 
[Insert Tables 18 - 20 about here] 
 
Column B, then, in each of the tables presents the results after replacing the 
composite measure of entrenchment at IPO, ENT, with its three underlying components, 
ENT_F1, ENT_F2, and ENT_F3. In all of the three regression models, ENT_F3, firm 
level external entrenchment, is positive and significant, while ENT_F1 and ENT_F2 are 
positive but not significant. Thus, the positive association between ENT and CEO cash 
compensation is driven entirely by anti-takeover measures adopted at the firm level, i.e., 
Golden Parachutes, Poison Pills, and increased percentage vote requirements for the 
approval of mergers. Results for hypothesis H1a are, thus, more refined, but unchanged. 
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A positive association between ENT_F3 and CEO cash compensation supports the 
managerial power perspective, but cannot be readily explained under optimal contracting. 
Table 21 shows similar analysis for CEO stock based compensation. Again, 
Column A reproduces the results of the initial analysis based on the variable ENT (Table 
8, Column D). 
 
[Insert Table 21 about here] 
 
The initial analysis did not establish a significant relationship between ENT (t =
1.18, p = .240) and lnSTOCKCOMP. After replacing ENT with its underlying 
components, components ENT_F1 and ENT_F2 show no significance, however, ENT_F3 
has a positive and (marginally) significant (t = 1.83, p (two-tailed) = .068) association 
with levels of CEO stock-based compensation. Thus, levels of stock-based compensation 
increase in the presence of firm-level external entrenchment. This surprising result shows 
that use of composite measures of governance may disguise discernible effects of specific 
governance characteristics. The observed increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity as 
firm-level external entrenchment increases may lend credence to optimal contracting, as 
increased stock-based compensation, which is performance based, is expected in the 
presence of entrenchment. However, increased stock-based compensation under optimal 
contracting is expected as a consequence of its underlying substitution hypothesis. 
Increased stock-based compensation on top of increased cash compensation contradicts 
incentive substitution. Instead, a "double dipping" explanation is more plausible: extreme 
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entrenchment enables CEOs not only to obtain higher cash compensation, which they 
prefer all things being equal because it is less risky, but also to increase their stock-based 
compensation. Thus, I interpret the enhanced results as strong support for H1b formulated 
in accordance with the managerial power perspective.  
Finally, Table 22 shows the results of the effect of components of entrenchment 
on CEO total compensation.  
 
[Insert Table 22 about here] 
 
Column A shows again the positive and (marginally) significant (t = 1.78, p (two-
tailed) = .077) association of ENT with lnTCOMP, which had been established 
previously. Column B shows that state-level external entrenchment (ENT_F1) and 
internal entrenchment (ENT_F2) have no significant association with CEO total 
compensation. However, firm-level external entrenchment (ENT_F3) shows a positive 
and significant association (t = 1.99, p (two-tailed) = .047). Thus, again the positive 
association of ENT with lnTCOMP is driven entirely by one component of total 
entrenchment, firm-level external entrenchment. After separating out the various 
components, ENT_F3 is more strongly associated with lnTCOMP than ENT was 
associated with lnTCOMP as indicated by the increase in the t-statistics and the 
associated increase in the confidence levels. Thus, use of the composite measure ENT has 
mitigated the ability to discern the true (and stronger) effect of ENT_F3 on total 
compensation. The results for H1c are unchanged in substance.  
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Analysis of the Effect of Components of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Pay-for-
Performance Sensitivity 
Initial results for the effect of entrenchment at IPO on CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivity have been presented in Table 16. Table 23 presents the results of a replication 
of this analysis replacing the interaction terms of ENT with RETURN and QROA with 
three interactions terms each to capture the differential effects of the identified 
components of entrenchment on the link between RETURN and QROA and changes in 
CEO cash and total compensation.  
 
[Insert Table 23 about here] 
 
Splitting the entrenchment variables into its underlying factor, on balance, does 
not affect the established relation between RETURN and QROA and changes in CEO 
cash compensation. Market-based and accounting- based returns both continue to have 
the expected positive association with changes in CEO cash compensation in the 
QlnCASHCOMPb and QlnCASHCOMPc specifications (Table 23, Columns A and B). 
However, RETURN and QROA are not significant in the model for QlnCASHCOMPa 
(Table 23, Column C), i.e., the marginally significant association between QROA (t =
1.95, p = .052, Table 16, Column C) and QlnCASHCOMPa disappears if ENT is replaced 
with its components.  
Turning to the interaction terms, none of the interaction terms of the entrenchment 
factors with RETURN are significant in any of the three specifications of CEO cash 
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compensations, (Table 23, Columns A, B, and C). This finding is in keeping with the 
earlier results presented in Table 16 in which no significant interaction between ENT and 
RETURN could be established.  
The results for the interaction terms of the entrenchment factors with QROA 
change dramatically, however. A positive and significant interaction is discernible 
between QROA and ENT_F1, state level external entrenchment, in the QlnCASHCOMPb 
and QlnCASHCOMPc specifications (Columns A and B). A negative and significant 
interaction exists between QROA and ENT_F2, internal entrenchment, in all three 
specifications (Columns A, B, and C). And, finally, QROA and ENT_F3 show a 
marginally significant positive association in the QlnCASHCOMPc specification only 
(Column B). Thus, a complex picture of the effect of entrenchment on the use of 
accounting performance measures in the design of CEO compensation contracts emerges. 
State-level external entrenchment, i.e., anti-takeover statutes, is associated with increased 
use of accounting performance measures in setting CEO pay. Similarly, in the 
QlnCASHCOMPc specification, the ENT_F3xQROA interaction is positive and 
marginally significant (t = 1.83, p (two-tailed) = .071). Thus, marginal evidence exists for 
increased sensitivity of CEO pay to QROA as state-level external entrenchment 
(ENT_F1) and firm-external entrenchment (ENT_F2) increases. At the same time, 
slightly stronger evidence exists that internal entrenchment (ENT_F2) reduces pay-for 
performance sensitivity of CEO cash compensation as indicated by the negative and 




Turning to the analysis of CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity for total 
compensation, I again observe a positive and significant main effect of RETURN on 
QlnTCOMP as established by previous literature (Table 23, Column D). Including 
interaction terms for the entrenchment factors rather than for ENT changes the result for 
QROA reported in Table 16, Column D. QROA now displays marginal significance, (t =
1.66, p (two-tailed) = .097). Previous literature has generally not been able to establish 
the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to changes in accounting performance 
measures, specifically QROA (Core, 2002). While the result is marginal, it may point to 
an interesting avenue for future research. If inclusion of interaction terms of QROA with 
variables capturing governance characteristics turns the main effect of QROA significant, 
it may indicate that lacking controls for interaction effects with firms' governance posture 
might have been responsible for the consistent findings of non-significance. If firms' use 
of QROA in the determination of total pay differs depending on governance 
characteristics, the absence of effective controls for these interactions possibly 
overshadows the main effect.  
Turning again to the interaction effects, none of the interaction terms for the 
factors of entrenchment with QROA are significant in the model exploring the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of total compensation (Table 23, Column D). This is consistent 
with the insignificance of the result reported for the interaction term ENTxQROA in 
Table 16, Column D. Nevertheless, their inclusion still may have controlled for some 
differences in use of QROA across levels of entrenchment that helped turning the 
coefficient on QROA significant. 
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Similarly, the interaction term ENTxRETURN was not significant at conventional 
levels initially. However, replacing ENT with its components again changes this result 
dramatically. Both, ENT_F1xRETURN (t = -1.76, p (two-tailed) = .079) and 
ENT_F3xRETURN (t = -1.72, p (two-tailed) = .088) now show a marginally significant, 
negative association with QlnTCOMP. Apparently, the decreasing effect of state and firm 
level external entrenchment on pay-for-performance sensitivity of total compensation to 
stock returns could not be detected using a composite measure of entrenchment. These 
results again support the notion that specific and well-defined measures of governance 
characteristics are preferable to broad-based measures of governance.  
In sum, components of entrenchment affect CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity 
in distinctive and complex ways. A significant contribution of this extended analysis is its 
ability to discern the components of entrenchment that are truly important and to shed 
light on the mechanisms at work, i.e., how these components of entrenchment affect the 
design of CEO compensation contracts. State-level external entrenchment and, with 
weaker support, firm-level external entrenchment are associated with increased 
sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to accounting performance as proxied by QROA. 
Thus, evidence exists that firms increase pay-for-performance sensitivity of cash 
compensation in response to external entrenchment. This is consistent with an optimal 
contracting view of executive compensation contracts. At the same time, however, 
internal entrenchment, obstacles to the efficacy of shareholders' control over management 
by means of restricted voting rights, decreases the sensitivity of cash compensation to 
accounting performance. There is no explanation under optimal contracting for 
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decreasing pay-for-performance as internal entrenchment increases. Furthermore, highly 
entrenched insiders have adopted measures across the board combining internal and 
external entrenchment when going public. On balance, then, no incremental positive 
effect of entrenchment on pay-for-performance of cash compensation exists when both 
internal and external entrenchment measures are combined.  
Furthermore, no evidence for increased pay-for-performance sensitivity of total 
compensation in response to entrenchment could be established. To the contrary, external 
entrenchment, state- and firm-level, reduces the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to 
stock returns. The results for H3a and H3b, thus, are materially unchanged. If anything, 
the extended analysis revealed additional support for the managerial power view by 
demonstrating a reduction of the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to returns as 
external entrenchment increases. The examination of the interaction term ENTxRETURN 





Summary and Conclusion 
In this study, I examine how corporate governance choices by firms' insiders prior 
to going public bear out in CEO salary in the post-IPO period. I focus on one specific 
aspect of firms' governance structure determined at IPO: legal provisions affecting insider 
entrenchment, i.e., legal provisions that make the replacement of firms' insiders in the 
post-IPO period difficult if not impossible. I introduce a new comprehensive measure of 
entrenchment, which is based on the statutory laws of the firm's state of incorporation and 
on provisions contained in the firm's corporate charter and bylaws. The eleven items that 
constitute my measure of total entrenchment have been selected to capture external and 
internal entrenchment. External entrenchment relates to obstacles to market control over 
management by reducing the efficacy of corporate takeovers. Internal entrenchment 
refers to limitations on shareholder voting power and thus the efficacy of shareholder 
control over management. 
Regression results show that my composite measure of total entrenchment at IPO 
is positively and significantly associated with levels of CEO cash and total compensation 
post-IPO. This effect appears to be consistent. Exploration of a potential time trend in the 
effect of entrenchment on post-IPO compensation over a period of five years did not 
reveal significant differences over time.  
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As the basis for an extended analysis, I conducted a principal component analysis 
of the eleven items on which my measure of total entrenchment is based. Three distinct 
components appear to contribute to total entrenchment: State-level external 
entrenchment, internal entrenchment, and firm-level external entrenchment. Replacing 
the measure of total entrenchment with its three components, I find that the positive 
association between entrenchment and CEO cash and total compensation is driven by 
firm-level external entrenchment only. In addition, I identify a positive and marginally 
significant association between firm-level external entrenchment and CEO stock-based 
compensation. The latter positive relationship was not identified when using the total 
entrenchment measure in the regressions. These results underscore the importance of 
well-defined and "tight" conceptualizations of governance characteristics as opposed to 
broad based measures (Larcker et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, the three components of entrenchment affect CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity in distinct ways. State- and firm-level external entrenchment 
reduces the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to stock returns. The sensitivity of 
CEO cash compensation to accounting performance (QROA) decreases in internal 
entrenchment, but increases in state-level and (with marginal results) for firm-level 
external entrenchment. 
Two competing theories may explain the relationship between governance 
decisions concerning insider entrenchment at IPO and executive compensation: the 
managerial-power and optimal-contracting theories. This study presents two sets of 
hypotheses reflecting expectations that may be formulated under either theory. The 
94 
 
evidence gravitates strongly towards supporting the managerial power view of executive 
compensation. Entrenched managers appear to be able to influence their compensation 
contracts in ways not consistent with "optimal" formations of pay arrangements. 
Specifically, little evidence for the substitution hypothesis underlying optimal contracting 
exists, as entrenchment is associated with higher levels of "all of the above:" cash, stock-
based, and total compensation. Furthermore, on balance, I find evidence for reduced and 
not increased pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation with respect to 
market and accounting performance measures. This finding suggests that entrenchment at 
IPO enables CEOs to at least partially disconnect their pay from firm performance. "Pay-
without-performance," however, is in clear contradiction of standard agency theoretical 
predictions, which form the basis for optimal contracting.  
Tests of Robustness 
As a test of robustness of my results, I replicated my results after implementing 
alternative measures and/or estimation techniques. For the dependent variables, I use 
three different specifications of CEO cash compensation. Results for these three 
specifications have been tabulated. For stock-compensation I employ a total of four 
variants of the Black-Scholes valuation methodology to derive the value of stock options. 
I assume zero dividend payments for all firms, or average dividends over the last three 
years, and I employ or do not employ adjustments for extreme volatility and/or dividend 
payments as outlined in Appendix B. I also use four different methods for computing 
total compensation, basing stock option values on different option valuations and 
including or excluding compensation disclosed as "other" in the firm's annual proxy 
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statements. There were no material differences in the results for stock-based or total 
compensation regardless of the specifications used.  
In all models, I control for firm size using the natural logarithm of lagged market 
value of equity and the natural logarithm of lagged sales (net) as an alternative to the 
natural logarithm of lagged total assets. Results using the market value of common equity 
are unchanged from the results based on total assets. In some specifications, use of net 
sales marginally affected the results. Specifically, the explanatory power of net sales was 
significantly weaker than total assets or market value of equity. Arguably, net sales, while 
a widely used control for firm size in established firms, may not be the most efficacious 
control for size in IPO firms. Controlling for size with contemporaneous rather than 
lagged total assets and market value of equity did not materially affect the results.  
All significance tests presented in this study are based on White standard errors, 
which are homoscedasticity robust and robust to within cluster correlation (Rogers or 
clustered standard errors). As an additional test for robustness of the results to choice of 
estimation technique, I estimated all of the models using estimation techniques based on 
GEE (SAS procedure PROC GENMOD) rather than GLS (SAS procedure PROC 
SURVEYREG). Furthermore, I specified different structures for the working correlation 
matrix used to model the correlation of the observations from firms. Table 24 illustrates 
this analysis for model 1 with the dependent variable lnTCOMP. 
 
[Insert Table 24 about here] 
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Specifying an independent structure of the working correlation matrix, the 
coefficient estimates for the results presented on the basis of GLS in Table 10, Column 
D, and the results based on GEE displayed in Table 24, Column A are identical. Only 
small marginal differences in the test statistics exist. Assuming an autoregressive, 
exchangeable, or unstructured correlation matrix has no material effect on the results 
(Table 24, Columns B – D). 
Limitations and Contributions  
The results of this study are subject to several limitations. First, data availability 
and the requirement for firms to be covered in three different databases (Compustat, 
CRSP, and ExecuComp) constrain the sample selection process. While the sample size is 
adequate, expanding the sample to include firms outside of the frame examined so far 
could further increase confidence in the findings. In the time-trend analysis only five 
years of data post-IPO were included. If a time-trend takes effect only at a later point in 
time, the present study was unable to discern it. Furthermore, because of the paucity of 
extant research on the effect of legal characteristics of governance on executive 
compensation in general, and in the context of IPO firms in particular, the scope of this 
study was necessarily broad. As additional relevant research is reported, identification 
and focus on more specific issues could be beneficial. 
This study extends prior research regarding the association of firms' governance 
characteristics and CEO compensation in multiple ways. First, the present study is the 
first to focus on the effect of insider entrenchment at IPO on subsequent CEO 
compensation. The study introduces a comprehensive measure of entrenchment, which 
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draws from firm- as well as state-level legal provisions, and provides insights into the 
frequency of adoption of entrenching provisions by firms going public from 1996 to 
2002. Second, the study, presents evidence for a strong positive association between 
entrenchment at IPO and increased subsequent CEO compensation. Additional evidence 
is presented that this effect is not transitory, but stable at least for up to five years post-
IPO. Third, entrenchment at IPO is shown to affect the use of market- and accounting-
based performance measures in the design of compensation contracts. On balance, 
entrenchment reduces the sensitivity of subsequent CEO compensation to stock returns 
and returns on assets. Fourth, the study identifies three distinct aspects of entrenchment 
and discerns their unique and incremental effect on the relationships identified above. 
Firm-level external entrenchment is the dominant factor displaying a strong positive 
association with levels of CEO compensation and a negative relation with the sensitivity 
of CEOs' total pay to stock returns. Fifth and finally, the focus on IPO firms overcomes a 
serious limitation to comparable studies of executive compensation, that of simultaneity, 
and provides for a unique testing for the competing managerial-power and optimal-
contracting views of executive compensation contracts. Little support is found for 
increased CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and a re-balancing of components of the 
CEO's compensation contract in response to entrenchment. Findings of this study are 
almost entirely consistent with a managerial power explanation according to which 
entrenchment at IPO causes a permanent shift in bargaining power, which enables CEOs 
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Summary of Hypotheses 
 Effect of Insider Entrenchment at IPO under 
Hypothesis Effect on Managerial Power Optimal Contracting 
H1a Cash compensation Positive Negative 
H1b Stock-based compensation 
Ambiguous; positive 
in the presence of 
increased cash 
compensation is 
indication of extreme 
power 
Positive 
H1c Total compensation Positive Ambiguous 
H2a Cash compensation over time Constantly positive Decreasing 
H2b Stock-based compensation over time Constantly positive Increasing 
H2c Total compensation over time Constantly positive Ambiguous  
H3a 
Pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of cash 
compensation 
Ambiguous; negative 





sensitivity of total 
compensation 
Ambiguous; negative 







Initial public offerings of common stock in the US from 1996 
to 2002  3,184
Foreign firms (324)
Financial services firms (469)
Subtotal: 2,355
No matching data on CompuStat (774)
No partial data on ExecuComp (1,357)
No matching data on CRSP (2)
Subtotal: 222
Various data problems; misidentified as IPO in Thompson 
SDC, no coverage in EDGAR for IPO year 1996 etc. (21)
Replacement observations 21





Descriptive Statistics for Entrenchment Data 
Min. Max. Mean Median
Std. 
Dev. 
Total entrenchment, ENT 0 11 3.64 4 2.147
Golden Parachute 0 1 .35 0 .478
Poison Pill 0 1 .12 0 .328
Staggered Board 0 1 .64 1 .480
Supermajority Charter 0 1 .56 1 .498
Supermajority Charter % .50 .900 .62 .67 .120
Supermajority Bylaws 0 1 .55 1 .498
Supermajority Bylaws % .50 1.00 .62 .67 .125
Supermajority Merger 0 1 .11 0 .311
Supermajority Merger % .50 .800 .52 .50 .062
Business Combination Statute 0 1 .92 1 .267
Opt-out Business Combination 0 1 .10 0 .305
Net Business Combination 0 1 .82 1 .385
Control Share Acquisition Statute 0 1 .14 0 .352
Opt-out Control Share 0 1 .08 0 .274
Net Control Share 0 1 .06 0 .244
Fair Price Statute 0 1 .15 0 .361
Opt-out Fair Price 0 1 .01 0 .116
Net Fair Price Statutes 0 1 .14 0 .347
Poison Pill Endorsement Statute 0 1 .15 0 .357
Constituencies Statute 0 1 .13 0 .338





Descriptive Statistics for Compensation, Firm Economic, and CEO Characteristics 
Variables 
n Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
CASHCOMPa 999 .00 3660.51 433.55 356.96 302.39
CASHCOMPb 999 .00 12961.65 778.05 535.25 884.60
CASHCOMPc 999 .00 13082.57 801.34 543.81 912.71
STOCKCOMP 999 .00 314605.14 3869.82 646.01 16835.02
TCOMP 981 .00 317107.60 4851.41 1440.00 17274.85
SIZE 998 4.70 73781.00 1760.64 264.54 6379.72
B_To_M 998 -32.64 11.78 .3563 .26 1.42
LEVERAGE 998 .02 24.03 .44 .37 0.80
CAP 996 .00 14.61 .36 .16 0.77
VOLATILITY 986 .03 1.34 .20 .17 0.11
RETURN 986 -2.91 4.15 .29 .24 0.78
QROA 995 -5.92 4.95 -.017 .00 0.47
DUAL_CLASS 999 0 1 .10 0 0.30
DELAWARE 999 0 1 .74 1 0.44
ZERO_CASH 999 0 1 .01 0 0.11
FOUNDER 991 0 1 .33 0 0.47
CHAIR 996 0 1 .62 1 0.49
NEW_CEO 995 0 1 .11 0 0.32
TENURE_FIRM 999 0 41 10.25 7 8.66
AGE 998 27 73 51.52 51 8.16
OWN 994 .00 .78 .0577 .0095 0.11
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Descriptive statistics are based on the maximum number 
of useable observations (firm-years) per variable. Statistics are for raw variables before adjusting to 1996 




























lnCASHCOMPb .898** .362** 1
QlnCASHCOMPb .337** .781** .407** 1
lnCASHCOMPc .899** .359** .997** .402** 1
QlnCASHCOMPc .335** .779** .402** .993** .401** 1
lnSTOCKCOMP .249** .039 .299** .034 .302** .035 1
QlnSTOCKCOMP -.015 .001 -.007 .016 -.010 .015 .554** 1
lnTCOMP .467** .070* .571** .074* .577** .070* .788** .335** 1
QlnTCOMP -.009 .070* .038 .169** .035 .164** .445** .799** .423** 1
ENT .083** .000 .106** -.002 .104** .001 .037 -.045 .034 -.046 1
SIZE .317** .012 .363** -.016 .369** -.017 .196** -.059 .451** -.097** -.018 1
B_TO_M .130** .127** .125** .157** .124** .156** .036 -.016 .035 .017 .018 .050 1
LEVERAGE -.018 -.044 -.021 -.045 -.021 -.046 -.079* -.063* -.046 -.051 -.058 .107** -.016 1
CAP .029 .006 .004 .003 .005 -.002 .010 -.030 .020 -.041 -.061 .149** -.006 .020
VOLATILITY -.199** -.034 -.235** -.035 -.236** -.037 .007 .056 -.057 .067* .017 -.285** .064* -.062
RETURN -.062* -.004 -.002 .109** -.005 .110** .082** .123** .055 .215** -.015 -.210** .048 -.105**
ENTxRETURN -.036 -.011 .024 .094** .021 .094** .064* .079* .033 .157** .168** -.180** .069* -.031
QROA -.052 -.045 -.030 -.018 -.031 -.018 .054 .061 .035 .077* .035 -.085** -.087** -.006
ENTxQROA -.067* -.064* -.045 -.040 -.046 -.039 .057 .083** .027 .086** -.011 -.074* -.087** .013
DUAL_CLASS -.045 -.034 .030 .001 .031 .002 -.003 -.013 .121** -.016 -.067* .300** .036 .015
DELAWARE .083** .009 .104** .004 .104** .004 .080* .009 .169** .009 -.285** .178** .020 .002
ZERO_CASH -.741** -.526** -.587** -.372** -.584** -.374** -.090** -.045 .005 -.071* -.040 .090** -.145** .049
FOUNDER -.230** -.052 -.232** -.029 -.235** -.029 -.200** .003 -.242** .016 -.009 -.176** .011 -.049
CHAIR .049 -.036 .077* -.036 .078* -.038 .042 -.020 .105** -.033 .051 .149** -.001 -.029
NEW_CEO -.055 -.063* -.046 -.007 -.043 -.006 .126** .186** .098** .139** -.038 .034 .011 .033
TENURE .118** -.042 .131** -.058 .130** -.058 -.085** -.035 -.056 -.063* .110** .095** .022 -.041
AGE .105** -.057 .130** -.076* .134** -.075* -.045 -.089** .043 -.121** .140** .162** .050 .066*
OWN -.241** -.048 -.257** -.036 -.259** -.037 -.351** -.027 -.355** -.024 .038 -.251** -.011 -.063*
112


































RETURN -.069* .267** 1
ENTxRETURN -.068* .270** .860** 1
QROA -.028 -.058 .186** .114** 1
ENTxQROA -.031 -.051 .126** .107** .910** 1
DUAL_CLASS -.042 -.097** -.004 -.025 -.026 -.010 1
DELAWARE .023 -.086** .012 -.047 .011 .009 .019 1
ZERO_CASH -.024 -.015 -.021 -.033 .019 .019 .209** .023 1
FOUNDER -.085** .006 -.018 -.016 -.012 -.012 .012 -.054 .061 1
CHAIR -.020 -.107** -.034 -.028 -.014 -.009 .007 .098** .068* .203** 1
NEW_CEO .043 .098** -.008 .004 -.060 -.030 .019 .009 .018 -.194** -.240** 1
TENURE -.075* -.239** -.088** -.053 .001 -.015 .124** -.187** -.046 .252** .235** -.211** 1
AGE -.029 -.212** -.064* -.017 .029 .012 .092** -.069* .119** -.032 .183** -.095** .333** 1
OWN -.077* .009 .001 -.004 .004 -.003 -.072* -.139** .055 .481** .177** -.159** .299** .047 1




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Salary and Bonus 
DV: lnCASHCOMPb 





est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Intercept: 5.822 44.68a 4.461 23.72a 5.917 14.88a 4.381 15.70a
Variable of primary 
interest: 
ENT + 0.067 2.54b 0.065 3.36a 0.058 2.50b 0.058 3.43a
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.279 9.89a 0.223 7.94a
B_TO_M ? -0.122 -0.22 -0.018 -0.33
LEVERAGE ? -0.321 -1.21 -0.303 -1.23
CAP ? -0.071 -1.85c -0.070 -1.75c
VOLATILITY ? -1.064 -4.22a -0.882 -3.69a
RETURN + 0.142 4.18a 0.118 3.77a
QROA + -0.026 -0.64 -0.033 -0.90
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.061 -0.42 -0.072 0.51
DELAWARE ? 0.219 2.31b 0.244 2.73a
ZERO_CASH - -6.586 -43.92a -6.537 -43.28a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.381 -3.27a -0.266 -3.49a
CHAIR + 0.062 0.73 0.050 0.80
NEW_CEO ? -0.122 -1.04 -0.115 -1.85c
TENURE + 0.025 3.33a 0.009 2.34b
AGE + -0.002 -0.21 0.008 1.48
OWN - -2.029 -4.78a -1.154 -2.85a
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
Model F 32.10a 117.80a 99.89a 328.44a
Adjusted R2 .129 .640 .245 .671
# of observations 998 979 980 960
# of clusters 221 219 219 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Salary, Bonus, and Other Annual 
Cash Compensation 
DV: lnCASHCOMPc 





est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Intercept: 5.843 44.47a 4.496 22.46a 5.914 14.77a 4.318 15.31a
Variable of primary 
interest: 
ENT + 0.062 2.52b 0.068 3.42a 0.057 2.44b 0.056 3.31a
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.280 9.35a 0.233 8.12a
B_TO_M ? 0.006 0.112 -0.015 -0.27
LEVERAGE ? -0.403 -1.31 -0.320 -1.30
CAP ? -0.068 -1.85c -0.069 -1.81c
VOLATILITY ? -1.124 -3.96a -0.844 -3.51a
RETURN + 0.144 4.24a 0.117 3.70a
QROA + -0.047 -1.22 -0.033 -0.86
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.004 0.03 0.070 0.49
DELAWARE ? 0.197 2.00a 0.231 2.59b
ZERO_CASH - -5.643 -8.22a -6.585 -45.67a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.392 -3.34a -0.273 -3.50a
CHAIR + 0.067 0.79 0.055 0.87
NEW_CEO ? -0.114 -0.97 -0.096 -1.50
TENURE + 0.024 3.33a 0.009 2.33b
AGE + -0.001 -0.16 0.009 1.60
OWN - -2.044 -4.82a -1.166 -2.87a
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
Model F 32.40a 26.72a 43.72a 481.63a
Adjusted R2 .131 .596 .245 .665
# of observations 998 982 980 962
# of clusters 221 219 219 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Salary 
DV: lnCASHCOMPa 





est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Intercept: 5.591 51.76a 4.620 34.41a 5.665 16.21a 4.387 19.33a
Variable of primary 
interest: 
ENT + 0.036 1.76c 0.037 2.59a 0.033 1.62 0.028 2.18b
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.208 10.12a 0.171 7.72a
B_TO_M ? 0.005 0.14 0.003 0.07
LEVERAGE ? -0.278 -1.30 -0.259 -1.29
CAP ? -0.035 -1.63 -0.032 -1.53
VOLATILITY ? -0.672 -3.25a -0.505 -2.55b
RETURN + 0.033 1.42 0.019 0.91
QROA + -0.023 -0.65 -0.031 -1.02
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.054 -0.54 -0.044 -0.45
DELAWARE ? 0.127 1.89c 0.142 2.22b
ZERO_CASH - -6.028 -63.55a -5.989 -46.34a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.326 -3.27a -0.215 -3.80a
CHAIR + 0.012 0.16 0.025 0.49
NEW_CEO ? -0.118 -1.21 -0.128 -2.98a
TENURE + 0.022 3.49a 0.006 1.93c
AGE + -0.001 -0.16 0.010 2.05b
OWN - -1.656 -4.34a -0.778 -2.41b
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
Model F 16.25a 287.07a 7.27a 169.32a
Adjusted R2 .104 .744 .215 .766
# of observations 999 981 981 964
# of clusters 221 219 219 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Stock-based Compensation 
DV: lnSTOCKCOMP 





est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Intercept: 5.134 11.34a 1.426 1.60 6.219 6.24a 3.460 3.01a
Variable of primary 
interest: 
ENT + 0.063 0.78 0.068 0.87 0.091 1.27 0.084 1.18
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.676 5.49a 0.535 4.28a
B_TO_M + -0.199 -0.96 -0.273 -1.11
LEVERAGE ? -1.828 -2.84a -1.983 -3.78a
CAP ? 0.025 0.19 -0.026 -0.20
VOLATILITY ? 0.713 0.48 0.692 -0.50
RETURN + 0.539 3.72a 0.487 3.35a
QROA + 0.338 1.71c 0.424 2.51b
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.602 -1.09 -0.388 -0.69
DELAWARE ? 0.444 1.05 0.150 0.41
ZERO_CASH - -3.853 -4.06a -3.812 -5.48a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.269 -0.66 -0.119 -0.29
CHAIR + 0.829 2.80a 0.597 2.09b
NEW_CEO + 1.014 2.93a 1.370 4.49a
TENURE + 0.023 0.43 -0.001 -0.07
AGE + -0.027 -1.29 -0.020 -0.97
OWN - -9.872 -6.36a -8.959 -5.96a
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
Model F 78.98a 13.97a 44.69a 15.11a
Adjusted R2 .078 .149 .179 .236
# of observations 997 980 979 961
# of clusters 221 219 219 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Total Compensation 
DV: lnTCOMP 





est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Intercept: 7.233 35.71a 4.121 13.03a 7.236 15.51a 4.655 10.69a
Variable of primary 
interest: 
ENT + 0.023 0.64 0.050 1.65 0.023 0.75 0.048 1.78c
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.516 10.55a 0.448 8.67a
B_TO_M ? -0.306 -2.80a -0.356 -3.67a
LEVERAGE ? -0.932 -2.47b -0.983 -2.99a
CAP ? -0.013 -0.29 -0.026 -0.65
VOLATILITY ? 0.784 1.47 0.523 0.96
RETURN + 0.286 4.87a 0.265 4.55a
QROA + 0.027 0.39 0.045 0.79
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.136 -0.58 -0.106 -0.44
DELAWARE ? 0.376 2.57b 0.267 2.09b
ZERO_CASH - 0.063 0.25 0.544 1.35
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.357 -2.07b -0.249 -1.73c
CHAIR + 0.046 3.85a 0.236 2.44b
NEW_CEO + 0.238 1.75c 0.460 4.55a
TENURE + 0.004 0.40 -0.001 -0.11
AGE + -0.002 -0.16 0.001 0.13
OWN - -3.366 -5.24a -2.492 -3.97a
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
Model F 16.88a 19.04a 56.15a 17.56a
Adjusted R2 .077 .326 .245 .378
# of observations 992 970 975 954
# of clusters 221 219 219 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Salary and Bonus over Time 
DV: lnCASHCOMPb 





estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 4.381 15.70a 4.383 15.62a 4.359 15.38a
Variables of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.058 3.43a 0.060 3.31a 0.068 4.17a
ENTxTIME ? -0.001 -0.19
ENTxYEAR2 ? -0.017 -2.11b
ENTxYEAR3 ? -0.013 -1.05
ENTxYEAR4 ? -0.023 -1.55
ENTxYEAR5 ? -0.004 -0.22
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.223 7.94a 0.224 7.95a 0.227 8.13a
B_TO_M ? -0.018 -0.33 -0.018 -0.32 -0.013 -0.24
LEVERAGE ? -0.303 -1.23 -0.303 -1.23 -0.319 -1.30
CAP ? -0.070 -1.75c -0.070 -1.75c -0.072 -1.76c
VOLATILITY ? -0.882 -3.69a -0.880 -3.68a -0.864 -3.63a
RETURN + 0.118 3.77a 0.118 3.76a 0.114 3.71a
QROA + -0.033 -0.90 -0.034 -0.89 -0.031 -0.80
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.072 0.51 -0.071 0.50 0.081 0.57
DELAWARE ? 0.244 2.73a 0.244 2.72a 0.235 2.61a
ZERO_CASH - -6.537 -43.28a -6.558 -45.21a -6.558 -45.89a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.266 -3.49a -0.266 -3.49a -0.262 -3.42a
CHAIR + 0.050 0.80 0.050 0.80 0.051 0.81
NEW_CEO ? -0.115 -1.85c -0.115 -1.83c -0.087 -1.38
TENURE + 0.009 2.34b 0.009 2.34b 0.009 2.38b
AGE + 0.008 1.48 0.008 1.48 0.008 1.49
OWN - -1.154 -2.85a -1.154 -2.86a -1.160 -2.87a
Year & Industry 
controls: 
Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant 
Model F 328.44a 417.31a 557.26a
Adjusted R2 .671 .664 .665
# of observations 960 961 961




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Salary, Bonus, and Other Annual 
Cash Compensation over Time 
DV: lnCASHCOMPc 





estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 4.318 15.31a 4.319 15.23a 4.322 15.11a
Variables of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.056 3.31a 0.058 3.10a 0.067 4.06a
ENTxTIME ? -0.001 -0.12
ENTxYEAR2 ? -0.018 -2.18b
ENTxYEAR3 ? -0.013 -1.05
ENTxYEAR4 ? -0.022 -1.46
ENTxYEAR5 ? -0.004 -0.21
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.233 8.12a 0.233 8.13a 0.234 8.14a
B_TO_M ? -0.015 -0.27 -0.015 -0.26 -0.011 -0.20
LEVERAGE ? -0.320 -1.30 -0.321 -1.30 -0.331 -1.34
CAP ? -0.069 -1.81c -0.069 -1.81c -0.071 -1.82c
VOLATILITY ? -0.844 -3.51a -0.846 -3.50a -0.838 -3.49a
RETURN + 0.117 3.70a 0.117 3.70a 0.112 3.63a
QROA + -0.033 -0.86 -0.033 -0.86 -0.032 -0.83
DUAL_CLASS ? 0.070 0.49 0.070 0.48 0.069 0.48
DELAWARE ? 0.231 2.59b 0.231 2.59b 0.228 2.54b
ZERO_CASH - -6.585 -45.67a -6.584 -45.12a -6.577 -45.66a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.273 -3.50a -0.273 -3.50a -0.271 -3.47a
CHAIR + 0.055 0.87 0.055 0.87 0.054 0.85
NEW_CEO ? -0.096 -1.50 -0.096 -1.49 -0.080 -1.27
TENURE + 0.009 2.33b 0.009 2.33b 0.009 2.32b
AGE + 0.009 1.60 0.009 1.59 0.008 1.59
OWN - -1.166 -2.87a -1.166 -2.87a -1.171 -2.88a
Year & Industry 
controls: 
Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant 
Model F 481.63a 422.45a 571.55a
Adjusted R2 .665 .664 .665
# of observations 962 962 961




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Salary over Time 
DV: lnCASHCOMPa 





estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 4.387 19.33a 4.380 19.27a 4.380 19.24a
Variables of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.028 2.18b 0.022 1.54 0.024 1.91b
ENTxTIME ? 0.002 0.73
ENTxYEAR2 ? 0.001 0.11
ENTxYEAR3 ? 0.008 0.92
ENTxYEAR4 ? 0.004 0.38
ENTxYEAR5 ? 0.010 0.79
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.171 7.72a 0.170 7.72a 0.170 7.70a
B_TO_M ? 0.003 0.07 0.002 0.05 0.003 0.07
LEVERAGE ? -0.259 -1.29 -0.257 -1.27 -0.256 -1.27
CAP ? -0.032 -1.53 -0.032 -1.53 -0.032 -1.52
VOLATILITY ? -0.505 -2.55b -0.499 -2.52b -0.505 -2.58b
RETURN + 0.019 0.91 0.020 0.92 0.020 0.93
QROA + -0.031 -1.02 -0.031 -1.03 -0.031 -1.04
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.044 -0.45 -0.041 -0.42 -0.041 -0.42
DELAWARE ? 0.142 2.22b 0.143 2.24b 0.143 2.24b
ZERO_CASH - -5.989 -46.34a -5.996 -45.85a -5.996 -45.44a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.215 -3.80a -0.217 -3.82a -0.217 -3.81a
CHAIR + 0.025 0.49 0.025 0.48 0.025 0.49
NEW_CEO ? -0.128 -2.98a -0.129 -3.00a -0.130 -2.98a
TENURE + 0.006 1.93c 0.006 1.93c 0.006 1.93c
AGE + 0.010 2.05b 0.010 2.05b 0.010 2.05b
OWN - -0.778 -2.41b -0.778 -2.40b -0.778 -2.40b
Year & Industry 
controls: 
Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant 
Model F 169.32a 165.43a 156.93a
Adjusted R2 .766 .767 .766
# of observations 964 964 964




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Stock-based Compensation over 
Time 
DV: lnSTOCKCOMP 





estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 3.460 3.01a 3.407 2.95a 3.450 2.97a
Variables of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.084 1.18 0.040 0.44 0.035 0.42
ENTxTIME ? 0.016 0.78
ENTxYEAR2 ? 0.068 0.99
ENTxYEAR3 ? 0.035 0.47
ENTxYEAR4 ? 0.150 2.00b
ENTxYEAR5 ? 0.046 0.51
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.535 4.28a 0.534 4.26a 0.550 4.23a
B_TO_M + -0.273 -1.11 -0.280 -1.13 -0.306 -1.22
LEVERAGE ? -1.983 -3.78a -1.964 -3.76a -2.013 -3.81a
CAP ? -0.026 -0.20 -0.026 -0.20 -0.026 -0.20
VOLATILITY ? 0.692 -0.50 0.735 -0.53 0.997 0.69
RETURN + 0.487 3.35a 0.488 3.36a 0.473 3.26a
QROA + 0.424 2.51b 0.420 2.50b 0.414 2.50b
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.388 -0.69 -0.366 -0.65 -0.472 -0.82
DELAWARE ? 0.150 0.41 0.159 0.43 0.156 0.42
ZERO_CASH - -3.812 -5.48a -3.856 -5.53a -2.450 -1.90c
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.119 -0.29 -0.130 -0.32 -0.111 -0.27
CHAIR + 0.597 2.09b 0.596 2.09b 0.582 2.05b
NEW_CEO + 1.370 4.49a 1.360 4.45a 1.379 4.53a
TENURE + -0.001 -0.07 -0.001 -0.06 0.001 -0.05
AGE + -0.020 -0.97 -0.019 -0.97 -0.022 -1.10
OWN - -8.959 -5.96a -8.960 -5.96a -9.041 -5.98a
Year & Industry 
controls: 
Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant 
Model F 15.11a 15.32a 9.25a
Adjusted R2 .236 .236 .233
# of observations 961 961 962




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Total Compensation over Time 
DV: lnTCOMP 





estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Coeff. 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 4.655 10.69a 4.670 10.66a 4.682 10.69a
Variables of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.048 1.78c 0.061 2.03b 0.050 1.88c
ENTxTIME ? -0.005 -0.68
ENTxYEAR2 ? 0.009 0.46
ENTxYEAR3 ? -0.008 -0.35
ENTxYEAR4 ? 0.004 0.13
ENTxYEAR5 ? -0.021 -0.72
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.448 8.67a 0.448 8.69a 0.450 8.70a
B_TO_M ? -0.356 -3.67a -0.353 -3.62a -0.357 -3.63a
LEVERAGE ? -0.983 -2.99a -0.988 -3.01a -0.994 -3.02a
CAP ? -0.026 -0.65 -0.026 -0.65 -0.025 -0.63
VOLATILITY ? 0.523 0.96 0.511 0.93 0.513 0.93
RETURN + 0.265 4.55a 0.265 4.54a 0.263 4.50a
QROA + 0.045 0.79 0.045 0.80 0.047 0.80
DUAL_CLASS ? -0.106 -0.44 -0.112 -0.47 -0.114 -0.56
DELAWARE ? 0.267 2.09b 0.264 2.06b 0.256 2.00b
ZERO_CASH - 0.544 1.35 0.537 1.30 0.509 1.25
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.249 -1.73c -0.245 -1.71c -0.254 -1.77c
CHAIR + 0.236 2.44b 0.236 2.45b 0.237 2.45b
NEW_CEO + 0.460 4.55a 0.463 4.56a 0.458 4.47a
TENURE + -0.001 -0.11 -0.001 -0.11 -0.001 -0.09
AGE + 0.001 0.13 0.001 0.13 0.001 0.09
OWN - -2.492 -3.97a -2.492 -3.98a -2.479 -3.94a
Year & Industry 
controls: 
Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant 
Model F 17.56a 17.06a 16.85a
Adjusted R2 .378 .376 .379
# of observations 954 954 955




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
Column A Column B Column C Column D 





est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Intercept: -0.146 -1.79c -0.131 -1.60 0.038 0.56 0.068 0.62
Variables of 
primary interest: 
RETURN + 0.085 2.12b 0.085 2.12b 0.012 0.35 0.514 3.57a
ENTxRETURN ? -0.000 -0.00 -0.000 -0.01 -0.006 -0.82 -0.050 -1.62
QROA + 0.122 1.67c 0.114 1.56c 0.123 1.95c 0.042 0.16
ENTxQROA ? -0.050 -1.51 -0.048 -1.44 -0.049 -1.95c 0.030 0.40
Year & Industry 
controls: 
Included Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant 
Model F 10.03a 3.45a 21.48a 12.32a
R2 .060 .057 .038 .090
Adjusted R2 .011 .008 -.013 .041
# observations 980 980 982 970
# clusters 219 219 219 219
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 








Poison Pill Endorsement Statute .863
Fair Price Statute .871
Control Share Acquisition Statute .771
Percentage Vote for Charter Amendments   .778
Staggered Board   .759
Percentage Vote for Bylaws Amendments   .752
Business Combination Statute   .651
Golden Parachute Agreement     .701
Poison Pill     .653
Percentage Vote for Merger Approvals     .517
Displayed is the pattern matrix. Extraction method is principal component analysis; 
rotation method is Oblimin with Kaiser normalization. Loadings < .4 have been 





Analysis of the Effect of Components of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Salary and Bonus 
DV: lnCASHCOMPb 





estimate t value 
Coefficient 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 4.381 15.70a 4.611 15.48a
Variable of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.058 3.43a
ENT_F1 + 0.087 1.49
ENT_F2 + 0.051 1.26
ENT_F3 + 0.870 2.98a
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.223 7.94a 0.213 7.61a
B_TO_M + -0.018 -0.33 -0.008 -0.15
LEVERAGE +/- -0.303 -1.23 -0.317 -1.29
CAP +/- -0.070 -1.75c -0.068 -1.67c
VOLATILITY +/- -0.882 -3.69a -0.827 -3.58a
RETURN + 0.118 3.77a 0.112 3.47a
QROA + -0.033 -0.90 -0.028 -0.75
DUAL_CLASS +/- -0.072 0.51 0.056 0.39
DELAWARE +/- 0.244 2.73a 0.327 1.96b
ZERO_CASH - -6.537 -43.28a -6.535 -46.05a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.266 -3.49a -0.262 -3.38a
CHAIR + 0.050 0.80 0.050 0.83
NEW_CEO +/- -0.115 -1.85c -0.116 -1.88c
TENURE + 0.009 2.34b 0.009 2.33b
AGE + 0.008 1.48 0.007 1.37
OWN - -1.154 -2.85a -1.156 -2.86a
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant 
Model F 328.44a 486.51a
Adjusted R2 .671 .666
# of observations 960 961
# of clusters 217 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Components of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Salary, Bonus, and 
Other Annual Cash Compensation 
DV: lnCASHCOMPc 





estimate t value 
Coefficient 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 4.318 15.31a 4.560 15.20a
Variable of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.056 3.31a
ENT_F1 + 0.094 1.61
ENT_F2 + 0.045 1.10
ENT_F3 + 0.088 2.98a
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.233 8.12a 0.219 7.66a
B_TO_M + -0.015 -0.27 -0.005 -0.09
LEVERAGE +/- -0.320 -1.30 -0.331 -1.34
CAP +/- -0.069 -1.81c -0.067 -1.73c
VOLATILITY +/- -0.844 -3.51a -0.800 -3.43a
RETURN + 0.117 3.70a 0.110 3.39a
QROA + -0.033 -0.86 -0.029 -0.75
DUAL_CLASS +/- 0.070 0.49 0.043 0.30
DELAWARE +/- 0.231 2.59b 0.337 2.04b
ZERO_CASH - -6.585 -45.67a -6.553 -45.96a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.273 -3.50a -0.271 -3.44a
CHAIR + 0.055 0.87 0.054 0.89
NEW_CEO +/- -0.096 -1.50 -0.108 -1.74c
TENURE + 0.009 2.33b 0.009 2.29b
AGE + 0.009 1.60 0.008 1.47
OWN - -1.166 -2.87a -1.170 -2.89a
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant 
Model F 481.63a 492.59a
Adjusted R2 .665 .666
# of observations 962 961
# of clusters 217 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Components of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Salary 
DV: lnCASHCOMPa 





estimate t value 
Coefficient 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 4.387 19.33a 4.477 18.20a
Variable of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.028 2.18b
ENT_F1 + 0.063 1.59
ENT_F2 + 0.010 0.31
ENT_F3 + 0.053 2.36b
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.171 7.72a 0.163 7.54a
B_TO_M + 0.003 0.07 0.012 0.30
LEVERAGE +/- -0.259 -1.29 -0.271 -1.35
CAP +/- -0.032 -1.53 -0.032 -1.48
VOLATILITY +/- -0.505 -2.55b -0.470 -2.45b
RETURN + 0.019 0.91 0.015 0.67
QROA + -0.031 -1.02 -0.027 -0.88
DUAL_CLASS +/- -0.044 -0.45 -0.059 -0.62
DELAWARE +/- 0.142 2.22b 0.232 2.12b
ZERO_CASH - -5.989 -46.34a -5.968 -44.59a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.215 -3.80a -0.213 -3.71a
CHAIR + 0.025 0.49 0.026 0.52
NEW_CEO +/- -0.128 -2.98a -0.126 -2.91a
TENURE + 0.006 1.93c 0.006 1.96c
AGE + 0.010 2.05b 0.093 1.95b
OWN - -0.778 -2.41b -0.783 -2.43b
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant 
Model F 169.32a 254.50a
Adjusted R2 .766 .768
# of observations 964 964
# of clusters 217 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Components of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Stock-based 
Compensation 
DV: lnSTOCKCOMP 





estimate t value 
Coefficient 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 3.460 3.01a 3.764 3.24a
Variable of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.084 1.18
ENT_F1 + 0.164 0.75
ENT_F2 + -0.035 -0.21
ENT_F3 + 0.246 1.70c
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.535 4.28a 0.507 4.04a
B_TO_M + -0.273 -1.11 -0.240 -0.99
LEVERAGE +/- -1.983 -3.78a -2.023 -3.91a
CAP +/- -0.026 -0.20 -0.027 -0.20
VOLATILITY +/- 0.692 -0.50 0.907 -0.65
RETURN + 0.487 3.35a 0.466 3.11a
QROA + 0.424 2.51b 0.438 2.58b
DUAL_CLASS +/- -0.388 -0.69 -0.446 -0.78
DELAWARE +/- 0.150 0.41 0.441 0.82
ZERO_CASH - -3.812 -5.48a -3.804 -5.64a
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.119 -0.29 -0.104 -0.25
CHAIR + 0.597 2.09b 0.601 2.15b
NEW_CEO +/- 1.370 4.49a 1.373 4.52a
TENURE + -0.001 -0.07 -0.001 -0.06
AGE + -0.020 -0.97 -0.021 -1.06
OWN - -8.959 -5.96a -8.893 -5.96a
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant 
Model F 15.11a 14.30a
Adjusted R2 .236 .237
# of observations 961 961
# of clusters 217 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Components of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Total 
Compensation 
DV: lnTCOMP 




estimate t value 
Coefficient 
estimate t value 
Intercept: 4.655 10.69a 4.864 10.40a
Variable of 
primary interest: 
ENT + 0.048 1.78c
ENT_F1 + 0.065 0.80
ENT_F2 + 0.037 0.52
ENT_F3 + 0.091 1.96b
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.448 8.67a 0.438 8.38a
B_TO_M + -0.356 -3.67a -0.343 -3.32a
LEVERAGE +/- -0.983 -2.99a -0.994 -3.03a
CAP +/- -0.026 -0.65 -0.025 -0.60
VOLATILITY +/- 0.523 0.96 0.589 1.08
RETURN + 0.265 4.55a 0.259 4.24a
QROA + 0.045 0.79 0.051 0.88
DUAL_CLASS +/- -0.106 -0.44 -0.119 -0.50
DELAWARE +/- 0.267 2.09b 0.332 1.50
ZERO_CASH - 0.544 1.35 0.600 1.37
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.249 -1.73c -0.242 -1.66c
CHAIR + 0.236 2.44b 0.235 2.48b
NEW_CEO +/- 0.460 4.55a 0.459 4.55a
TENURE + -0.001 -0.11 -0.001 -0.11
AGE + 0.001 0.13 0.000 0.05
OWN - -2.492 -3.97a -2.474 -3.94a
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant 
Model F 17.56a 39.97a
Adjusted R2 .378 .378
# of observations 954 954
# of clusters 217 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Components of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Pay-for-
performance Sensitivity 
Column A Column B Column C Column D 




est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Coeff. 
est. t value 
Intercept: -0.141 -1.71c -0.123 -1.49 0.042 0.62 0.091 0.85
Variables of 
primary interest: 
RETURN + 0.083 3.06a 0.078 2.92a -0.007 -0.32 0.318 4.85a
ENT_F1xRET +/- 0.002 0.08 -0.015 -0.91 0.007 0.50 -0.092 -1.76c
ENT_F2xRET +/- 0.005 0.20 0.004 0.20 -0.020 -1.25 -0.017 -0.26
ENT_F3xRET +/- -0.018 -0.68 -0.005 -0.19 -0.000 0.01 -0.102 -1.72c
QROA + 0.106 1.87c 0.122 2.19b 0.012 0.28 0.268 1.66c
ENT_F1xQROA +/- 0.178 1.86c 0.196 2.08b -0.013 -0.12 0.048 0.17
ENT_F2xQROA +/- -0.167 -3.01a -0.168 -3.01a -0.104 -2.02b 0.065 0.66
ENT_F3xQROA +/- 0.140 1.64 0.155 1.82c 0.066 1.07 0.193 1.07
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant 
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant 
Model F 2.90a 3.49a 25.40a 7.52a
R2 .072 .068 .040 .097
Adjusted R2 .019 .015 -.015 .044
# observations 979 978 981 969
# clusters 219 219 219 219
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 




Analysis of the Effect of Entrenchment at IPO on CEO Total Compensation using GEE 
Model Fitting 

















est. z value 
Coeff. 
est. z value 
Intercept: 4.655 11.08a 5.180 13.63a 4.910 12.33a 4.785 13.02a
Variable of primary 
interest: 
ENT + 0.048 1.84c 0.044 1.71c 0.047 1.83c 0.052 2.16b
Firm controls: 
SIZE + 0.448 8.99a 0.405 8.84a 0.438 9.12a 0.416 8.73a
B_TO_M + -0.356 -3.80a -0.299 -3.22a -0.342 -3.89a -0.291 -3.26a
LEVERAGE +/- -0.983 -3.10a -0.674 -2.85a -0.731 -2.75a -0.550 -2.14b
CAP +/- -0.026 -0.67 -0.042 -1.28 -0.059 -2.30b -0.041 -1.66c
VOLATILITY +/- 0.523 0.99 0.236 0.49 0.334 0.70 0.419 0.88
RETURN + 0.265 4.72a 0.202 3.68a 0.233 4.27a 0.200 3.60a
QROA + 0.045 0.82 0.108 1.46 0.108 1.68 0.051 0.73
DUAL_CLASS +/- -0.106 -0.46 -0.003 -0.01 -0.073 -0.32 -0.012 -0.06
DELAWARE +/- 0.267 2.17b 0.279 2.39b 0.263 2.21b 0.315 3.02a
ZERO_CASH - 0.544 1.35 -0.142 0.95 0.122 0.53 -0.084 -0.58
CEO controls: 
FOUNDER - -0.249 -1.80c -0.333 -2.49b -0.355 -2.67a -0.346 -2.66a
CHAIR + 0.236 2.53b 0.250 3.05a 0.227 2.77a 0.219 2.89a
NEW_CEO +/- 0.460 4.71a 0.519 5.16a 0.510 5.16a 0.433 4.25a
TENURE + -0.001 -0.11 0.001 0.16 -0.001 -0.14 -0.001 -0.13
AGE + 0.001 0.14 -0.001 -0.66 -0.003 -0.39 0.001 0.02
OWN - -2.492 -4.11a -2.130 -3.61a -1.765 -2.89a -1.751 -2.89a
Year & Industry 
controls: Included Included Included Included 
YEAR Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
INDUSTRY Some significant Some significant Some significant Some significant
# of observations 954 954 954 954
# of clusters 217 217 217 217
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-sided test). Significance tests are based on White standard errors, which are 
robust to within cluster correlation (Rogers or clustered standard errors). Estimation method is GEE. 
Independent, autoregressive, exchangeable, and unstructured specify the structure of the working 




Inputs for Black-Scholes Calculations 




Volatility High Yield 
Risk Free 
Rate 
1995 0.331 0.157 0.599 5.851 5.49 
1996 0.319 0.155 0.590 5.826 6.34 
1997 0.319 0.163 0.590 5.51 5.77 
1998 0.358 0.179 0.645 5.093 4.73 
1999 0.395 0.198 0.706 4.582 6.55 
2000 0.458 0.236 0.850 4.741 5.16 
2001 0.486 0.245 0.913 5.048 4.84 
2002 0.497 0.250 0.916 5.006 3.36 
2003 0.471 0.229 0.881 4.796 3.77 
2004 0.438 0.207 0.850 4.879 3.94 
2005 0.384 0.172 0.73 4.748 4.36 
2006 0.339 0.155 0.629 4.426 4.70 





Fama-French (1997) Industries 
 Industry SIC Codes 
Agric Agriculture 0100-0799, 2048-2048 
Food Food Products 2000-2046, 2050-2063, 2070-2079 
Soda Candy and Soda 2090-2095, 2098-2099 
Beer Alcoholic Beverages 2064-2068, 2086-2087, 2096-2097  
Smoke Tobacco Products 2080-2085 
Toys Recreational Products 2100-2199, 0900-0999, 3650-3652, 3732-3732, 
3930-3949 
Fun Entertainment 7800-7841, 7900-7999  
Books Printing and Publishing 2700-2749, 2770-2799  
Hshld Consumer Goods 2047-2047, 2391-2392, 2510-2519, 2590-2599, 
2840-2844, 3160-3199, 3229-3231, 3260-3260, 
3262-3263, 3269-3269, 3630-3639, 3750-3751, 
3800-3800, 3860-3879, 3910-3919, 3960-3961, 
3991-3991, 3995-3995 
Clths Apparel 2300-2390, 3020-3021, 3100-3111, 3130-3159, 
3965-3965 
Hlth Healthcare 8000-8099 
MedEq Medical Equipment 3693-3693, 3840-3851  
Drugs Pharmaceutical Products 2830-2836 
Chems Chemicals 2800-2829, 2850-2899  
Rubbr Rubber and Plastic 
Products 
3000-3000, 3050-3099  
Txtls Textiles 2200-2295, 2297-2299, 2393-2395, 2397-2399 
BldMt Construction Materials 0800-0899, 2400-2439, 2450-2459, 2490-2499, 
2950-2952, 3200-3219, 3240-3259, 3261-3261, 
3264-3264, 3270-3299, 3420-3442, 3446-3452, 
3490-3499, 3996-3996 
Cnstr Construction 1500-1549, 1600-1699, 1700-1799 
Steel Steel Works, Etc. 3300-3369, 3390-3399 
FabPr Fabricated Products 3400-3400, 3443-3444, 3460-3479 
Mach Machinery 3510-3536, 3540-3569, 3580-3599 
ElcEq Electrical Equipment 3600-3621, 3623-3629, 3640-3646, 3648-3649, 
3660-3660, 3691-3692, 3699-3699 
Misc Miscellaneous 3900-3900, 3990-3990, 3999-3999, 9900-9999 
Autos Automobiles and Trucks 2296-2296, 2396-2396~3010-3011, 3537-3537, 
3647-3647, 3694-3694, 3700-3716, 3790-3792, 
3799-3799 
Aero Aircraft 3720-3729 
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Ships Shipbuilding, Railroad 
Eq. 
3730-3731, 3740-3743 
Guns Defense 3480-3489, 3760-3769, 3795-3795 
Gold Precious Metals 1040-1049 
Mines Nonmetallic Mining 1000-1039, 1060-1099, 1400-1499 
Coal Coal 1200-1299 
Enrgy Petroleum and Natural 
Gas 
1310-1389, 2900-2911, 2990-2999 
Util Utilities 4900-4999 
Telcm Telecommunications 4800-4899 
PerSv Personal Services 7020-7021, 7030-7039, 7200-7212, 7215-7299, 
7395-7395, 7500-7500, 7520-7549, 7600-7699, 
8100-8199, 8200-8299, 8300-8399, 8400-8499, 
8600-8699, 8800-8899 
BusSv Business Services 2750-2759, 3993-3993,7300-7372, 7374-7394, 
7397-7397, 7399-7399, 7510-7519, 8700-8748, 
8900-8999 
Comps Computers 3570-3579, 3680-3689, 3695-3695, 7373-7373 
Chips Electronic Equipment 3622-3622, 3661-3679, 3810-3810, 3812-3812 
LabEq Measuring and Control 
Equip 
3811-3811, 3820-3830 
Paper Business Supplies 2520-2549, 2600-2639, 2670-2699, 2760-2761, 
3950-3955 
Boxes Shipping Containers 2440-2449, 2640-2659, 3210-3221, 3410-3412 
Trans Transportation 4000-4099, 4100-4199, 4200-4299, 4400-4499, 
4500-4599, 4600-4699, 4700-4799 
Whlsl Wholesale 5000-5099, 5100-5199 
Rtail Retail 5200-5299, 5300-5399, 5400-5499, 5500-5599, 
5600-5699, 5700-5736, 5900-5999 
Meals Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 5800-5813, 5890-5890, 7000-7019, 7040-7049, 
7213-7213 
Banks Banking 6000-6099, 6100-6199 
Insur Insurance 6300-6399, 6400-6411 
RlEst Real Estate 6500-6553 








Description of Anti-takeover Statutes 
The anti-takeover statutes included in this study are the laws comprising the Anti-
takeover Protection Index (API), Bebchuk and Cohen (2003). In the following, I give a 
brief description of their nature: 
Control Share: A control share acquisition statute essentially requires a hostile 
bidder to put its offer to a vote of the shareholders before proceeding with it. If a bidder 
does not do so and purchases a large block of shares, it runs a very serious risk of not 
being able to vote these shares at all and thus will not be able to gain control despite its 
large holdings. 
Fair Price: A fair-price statute requires a bidder who succeeds in gaining control 
and then proceeds to remove any remaining shareholders ("second-step freeze-out") to 
pay the remaining minority shareholders the same price it paid for shares acquired 
through its bid. This prevents bidders from using the threat of a second-step freeze-out at 
a low price as a mechanism for pressuring shareholders to sell. 
Business Combination: Certain Business combination statutes prevent a bidder 
that gains control from merging the target with its own assets for a specified period of 
time (unless certain difficult-to-meet conditions are satisfied). Such constraints on second 
step freeze-outs might make it more difficult for successful bidders to realize synergies 
and might reduce the potential profits from a takeover, which could discourage takeovers. 
Poison Pill Endorsement: Poison Pills are warrants or rights issued by the 
company that are triggered in the event that any buyer obtains a significant percentage of 
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shares. If triggered, the holder of the right is entitled to purchase shares at a discount or to 
otherwise receive significant value. As long as they are not redeemed poison pills make a 
takeover prohibitively costly. Delaware courts have approved the use of pills in a series 
of well-known cases, starting with Moran v. Household International in 1985 (490 A.2d 
1059). Other states have found it necessary to ground the use of poison pills in legislation 
either because of the absence of such cases or in a few instances to reverse court rulings 
against poison pills. 
Stakeholder Interests: Some states have passed legislation, which specifically 
allows managers to take into account interests of non-shareholders in defending against 
takeovers. Such statutes are regarded antitakeover statutes because taking into account 
how a takeover would affect employees or debt holders etc. provides managers with extra 
reasons for opposing the takeover. As a result, it is very difficult for shareholders to have 






Stock Option Valuation Methodology 
The basic instrument used for the determination of a stock option's estimated 
value at grant was the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model. The model requires six 
inputs: 
• The exercise price or strike price per share, i.e., the price the executive must 
pay to exercise the option.  
• The market price per share at the time of grant.  
• The term of the grant.  
• The estimated risk-free rate of interest during the term of the grant.  
• The estimated stock price volatility during the term of grant.  
• The estimated dividend yield on the stock during the term of the grant.  
In determining the model inputs, I followed the modified Black-Scholes option 
valuation methodology as employed in Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database.9
Specifically: The strike price per share was that specified by the company in its proxy 
statement. The market price per share at the time of grant was assumed to be equal to the 
strike price per share, unless the company specified otherwise in its proxy statement. 
Since the vast majority of firms in my sample have a calendar year fiscal year, all options 
were assumed to be granted on July 1st of the particular year for which data were 
reported as a simplifying assumption. The nominal term of the option was calculated as 





reported by the company in its proxy statement. Figures thus calculated were then 
rounded to the nearest whole year. Next, the term of the option was reduced by 30% to an 
amount of 70% of the actual term. This reduction in the option term was implemented to 
reflect that executives rarely wait until the expiration date to exercise their options. 
The risk-free rate of interest used was the approximate average yield that could 
have been earned in the particular year by investing in a U.S. Treasury bond carrying a 
seven-year term. The use of a Treasury bond satisfies the Black-Scholes condition that 
the interest rate be free of risk and that the compounded rate of interest that may be 
earned on the risk-free security be known at the time of grant. Moreover, the use of a 
security with a seven-year term first recognizes the fact that the overwhelming majority 
of executive stock option grants carry ten year terms and then goes on to reflect the 
earlier-mentioned assumption that an executive will exercise his option 70% of the way 
into its nominal term.  
I use a 60-month volatility based on the standard deviation of returns (adjusted for 
stock-splits etc.) using the CRSP monthly data file. If a stock has traded for less than 60 
months, I use as many months as possible to do the calculation. If the stock has traded for 
less than one year, I input the average volatility value for the S&P 1500. If the firm's 
stock price volatility in a given year was higher than the 95th percentile of the volatility 
distribution of the S&P 1500 market volatility, I lowered it to the 95% percentile value. If 
the stock price volatility was lower than the 5th percentile of the volatility distribution, I 
increased it to the 5th percentile value. These two adjustments serve to avoid the 
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introduction of volatility figures, which, though currently correct, are so far outside the 
norm as to make it likely that they will be incorrect for the long-term future.  
As with the stock price volatility, I strived to assure that the input dividend yield 
was not outside the range of reasonableness. To measure past yields, I averaged dividend 
yields over a three-year period. Then, if the dividend yield was higher than the 95th 
percentile of the distribution of dividend yields of the S&P 1500 companies, I reduced it 
to the respective 95th percentile value. The values so used for the various adjustments are 
summarized in Table 25.  






The following table lists the names and definitions of all variables used in this 
study. Dependent variables, variables of primary interest, and control variables are 
grouped together in the following table. Within each group, listing is in order of general 
appearance of variables in the models. All variables representing dollar amounts have 
been deflated to year 1996 constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Variables Definitions 
Dependent Variables  
lnCASHCOMPa Log of the salary paid to the CEO for the fiscal year. 
QlnCASHCOMPa Change in lnCASHCOMPa from the year prior to the fiscal 
year to the fiscal year. 
lnCASHCOMPb Log of the sum of salary and bonus paid to the CEO for the 
fiscal year. 
QlnCASHCOMPb Change in lnCASHCOMPb from the year prior to the fiscal 
year to the fiscal year. 
lnCASHCOMPc Log of the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash 
compensation paid to the CEO for the fiscal year. 
QlnCASHCOMPc Change in lnCASHCOMPc from the year prior to the fiscal 
year to the fiscal year. 
lnSTOCKCOMP Log of the sum of stock option grants and restricted stock 
grants to the CEO for the fiscal year. 
QlnSTOCKCOMP Change in lnSTOCKCOMP from the year prior to the fiscal 
year to the fiscal year. 
lnTCOMP Log of the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash 
compensation, stock option grants, restricted stock grants 
and all other compensation paid to the CEO for the fiscal 
year. 
QlnTCOMP Change in lnTCOMP from the year prior to the fiscal year to 
the fiscal year. 
Variables of Interest:  
ENT Entrenchment score for the firm ranging from 0 to 11. 
ENT_F1 Entrenchment factor 1, “Anti-Takeover Statutes.” 
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ENT_F2 Entrenchment factor 2, “Firm-Level Internal Entrenchment.” 
ENT_F3 Entrenchment factor 3, “Firm-Level External 
Entrenchment.” 
ENTxTIME Interaction term of ENT with a time trend variable equaling 
1 in year one post-IPO, 2 in year two post-IPO etc.  
ENTxYEAR2 Interaction term of ENT with an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the observation is from year 2 post-IPO and zero 
otherwise. Year 1 post-IPO is base year. 
ENTxYEAR3 Interaction term of ENT with an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the observation is from year 3 post-IPO and zero 
otherwise. Year 1 post-IPO is base year. 
ENTxYEAR4 Interaction term of ENT with an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the observation is from year 4 post-IPO and zero 
otherwise. Year 1 post-IPO is base year. 
ENTxYEAR5 Interaction term of ENT with an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the observation is from year 5 post-IPO and zero 
otherwise. Year 1 post-IPO is base year. 
ENTxRETURN Interaction term of ENT and RETURN 
ENTxQROA Interaction term of ENT and QROA 
ENT_F1xRETURN Interaction term of ENT_F1 and RETURN 
ENT_F2xRETURN Interaction term of ENT_F2 and RETURN 
ENT_F3xRETURN Interaction term of ENT_F3 and RETURN 
ENT_F1xQROA Interaction term of ENT_F1 and QROA 
ENT_F2xQROA Interaction term of ENT_F2 and QROA 
ENT_F3xQROA Interaction term of ENT_F3 and QROA 
Control Variables --
Characteristics of the 
Firm: 
 
SIZE Log of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
B_TO_M Ratio of the book value of common equity to the market 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
CAP Ratio of fixed assets (net property, plant and equipment) to 
net sales at the end of the fiscal year. 
VOLATILITY Standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the fiscal 
year. 
RETURN Fiscal year stock return computed as the sum of monthly 
returns obtained from CRSP monthly stock files. 
QROA Difference in earnings before extraordinary items to total 
assets from the year prior to the fiscal year to the fiscal year. 
DUAL_CLASS Indicator variable equal to 1 if at least on class of shares with 
superior voting rights exists and zero otherwise. 
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DELAWARE Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is incorporated in the 
state of Delaware and zero otherwise. 
ZERO_CASH Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm discloses an explicit 
policy not to pay cash compensation to CEO and zero 
otherwise. 
Control Variables -- 
Characteristics of the 
CEO: 
 
FOUNDER Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is the founder of the 
firm and zero otherwise. 
CHAIR Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds the position of 
chairperson of the board of directors and zero otherwise. 
NEW_CEO Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is new during the 
fiscal year and zero otherwise. 
TENURE The number of years the CEO has been employed by the 
firm at the end of the fiscal year. 
AGE The age of the CEO at the end of the fiscal year. 
OWN Percentage of common shares of the firm owned by the CEO 




YEAR Indicator variables for calendar year of observation; 2001 is 
base year.  
INDUSTRY Indicator variables for Fama-French industry sectors; 
Business Services industry is base industry. Industries are 
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